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Abstract
This paper proposes a theory of intermediation in which intermediaries emerge
endogenously as the choice of agents. In contrast to the previous trading models
based on random matching or exogenous networks, we allow traders to explicitly
choose their trading partners as well as the number of trading links in a dynamic
framework. We show that traders with higher trading needs optimally choose to
match with traders with lower needs for trade, and they build fewer links in equi-
librium. As a result, traders with the least trading need turn out to be the most
connected and have the highest gross trade volume. The model therefore endoge-
nously generates a core-periphery trading network that we often observe: a financial
architecture that involves a small number of large, interconnected institutions. We
use this framework to study bid-ask spreads, trading volume, asset allocation.
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1 Introduction
This paper contributes a theory of intermediation and a new trading framework for de-
centralized or over-the-counter (OTC) markets. We maintain bilateral exchange as a
feature of decentralized markets, our approach, however, is fundamentally di↵erent from
the existing literature based on random search (starting from Du e, et al. (2005)[15]).
Rather than assuming agents meet exogenously and at random, we explicitly specify the
environment that limits the ability to communicate and to trade, and, more importantly,
we determine who meets whom and the meeting rate for each agent as a part of the
equilibrium.
Since all trading links are formed optimally, we provide an explicit answer to why
the decentralized markets often involve active intermediaries. We show that a trading
network that exhibits the hierarchical core-peripheral structure, where certain traders
intermediate a large amount of the trades,1 emerge endogenously as the choice of agents.
And, maybe surprisingly, such a structure is in fact e cient subject to the friction in
decentralized markets. Our result therefore provides new insights on the existence of a
small number of large and interconnected financial institutions. While it is well known
that such a structure has important implications for the stability of the financial system
and its regulation,2 what remains unknown is why such a trading structure arises in the
first place and why certain financial institutions become more connected than others.3
To directly address these questions, we build a dynamic trading model with multiple
rounds of bilateral trade, in which matching is based on observable heterogeneities across
traders and is subject to pairwise stability. The key heterogeneity we focus on involves the
riskiness of traders’ asset positions, modeled as the volatility of their valuations over their
assets. We assume that a trader can only observe the realized valuation of another trader
after they agree to be matched, and their agreement on the terms of trade is contingent
on the realized valuations within the pair. The assumption that traders must contact
(match with) each other in order to find out each other’s desirable position is designed to
capture the friction that prevents agents from perfectly locating the right counterparty,
1Li and Schurho↵ (2011)[32] and Bech and Atalay (2010)[11] document the hierarchical core-peripheral
structure in the municipal bond market and the federal funds market, respectively. They show that the
number of dealer connections is heavily skewed with a fat right tail populated by several core dealers.
2There is a growing literature that focuses on the role of the architecture of financial system as an
amplification mechanism. For example, Allen et al. (2000)[6], Acemoglu et al. (2014)[1], Elliott et al.
(2014)[17], Cabrales et al. (2014)[12], and Gofman (2014) [23] study the financial contagion in a given
network.
3Having a model with endogenous intermediaries is crucial for policy analysis. This concept resonates
within the motivation behind Townsend (1978)[39], where he showed that intermediation and a star
network may emerge endogenously when bilateral exchange is costly.
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which resonates with the basic idea of search friction.
We demonstrate that the heterogeneous exposure to risks is a fundamental driving
force for intermediation, where certain institutions specialize in the role of intermediaries
endogenously.4 In equilibrium, institutions with a higher exposure to risk, those with
higher risk-sharing needs, always match with institutions that have more stable positions
(we think of these institutions as those with more diversified portfolios and thus a lower
need to trade). This is true even when valuations are negatively correlated. The intuition
is simple: the trading friction suggests that misallocation is inevitable within a matched
pair. Trading through stable types minimizes the cost of asset misallocation, even though
traders with stable preferences have a lower need to trade. This economics force suggests
that the joint output is submodular in the exposure to risks of the two matched traders,
and, as is well known in the matching literature with transferable utility, the equilibrium
is therefore negative assortative.
As a result, stable types, who have the comparative advantage of bearing the cost
from asset misallocation, behave as market makers in equilibrium: that is, they take on
the opposite position of a volatile type regardless of their own preference. This insight
carries through in a dynamic environment with an additional element: traders with higher
exposure to risk leave the market after matching with traders with lower exposure to risk.
This is because trading through market makers guarantees that they receive the first-
best asset allocation. The dynamic matching equilibrium therefore follows a recursive
structure: in each round, traders who are still participating in the market are endogenously
partitioned into two di↵erent roles: market makers (relatively stable types) and customers
(relatively volatile types). Customers trade through their market makers and leave after
the trade; market makers, on the other hand, continue trading in the next round.
The model therefore endogenously generates a core-periphery network with a multi-
layered hierarchy, where traders with lower exposure to risk specialize in market making.
Consistent with recent empirical studies, the model predicts that the distribution of trad-
ing activity is highly skewed, with only a few institutions intermediating a large amount
of trade and with heterogeneity in the interconnectedness of dealer banks.5 Traders who
do not need to trade for themselves turn out to be the core of the network: they are the
most connected and have the highest gross trade volume. We further establish time-series
4Our dynamic framework can itself be applied generally to environments with di↵erent notions of
heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we focus on this particular heterogeneity throughout the paper.
5Afonso and Lagos (2014)[3] and Atkeson et al. (2014)[7] document that the distribution of connections
is highly skewed. Li and Schu¨rho↵ (2014)[32] find that municipal bond markets have a higher level of
heterogeneity among dealers in terms of connectedness, and trading costs increase strongly with dealer
centrality.
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and cross-sectional predictions on the trade volume and asset prices.
Motivated by the existing (growing) literature on network and financial contagion,6 we
study the spread of unexpected shocks throughout this highly skewed, interconnected net-
work. We do so by applying our framework to unsecured lending markets and introducing
counterparty risk as a potential cost of interconnections. We characterize the pattern of
financial contagion and analyze how interconnectedness determines the extent of financial
contagion in this highly asymmetric structure. We find that financial interconnectedness
will not exacerbate contagion when the initial loss to the financial system is not too large,
but financial contagion will only spread across the whole network with relatively large
initial shocks. Furthermore, since most works in the literature take specified networks as
given, it remains unknown how the underlying network responds to a policy that aims
to decrease the interconnection by limiting trading activities of banks. Our model thus
provides a framework in which to formally analyze such questions.
Related Literature
There are two approaches to modeling OTC markets. The first one is based on a ran-
dom search model, where the counterparty arrives only at an exogenous rate (see Du e,
Garleanu and Pedersen (2005)[15], Lagos and Rocheteau (2009)[29], Afonso and Lagos
(2014)[4], and Hugonnier, Lester and Weill (2014)[26]). The other one is based on an ex-
ogenous network structure in OTC markets (e.g., Gofman (2011)[22], Babus and Kondor
(2012)[10], and Malamud and Rostek(2012) [33]). Our main contribution relative to the
literature on OTC markets is to develop a framework that allows matching to be based
on ex ante characteristics of traders and generates an endogenous trading structure.
One reason why it is desirable to endogenize the meeting process is that many have
argued that random matching is an unrealistic feature of an asset market. One may
counter that random matching is a tractable or reduced-form way to model frictions. In
fact, we show that certain predictions in random matching do go through, whereas others
change significantly. Since our framework allows for heterogeneous valuation, it is closest
to those in Afonso and Lagos (2014)[4], Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2014)[26], and
Shen, Wei, and Yan (2015)[38]. All of these papers point out that agents with moderate
valuation play the role of intermediaries endogenously as they buy and sell over time when
they randomly match with others. Hence, consistent with our results, trading volumes
are also concentrated among those traders. A new framework developed by Atkeson,
6The reader is referred to Allen and Babus (2009) [5] and to Glasserman and Young (2015)[21] for
rencent surveys of the literature on financial contagion in networks.
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Eisfeldt, and Weill (2014)[7] also delivers similar empricial predictions. In a static model,
they show that large banks endogenously become dealers in the sense that they have the
highest gross notional trade volume.7
None of these papers, howoever, allows traders to choose with whom to trade, hence
all meetings are possible. Our framework, on the other hand, allows us to establish an
unique insight: it is optimal and constrained e cient for traders with higher needs for
trade (customers) to trade with traders with fewer needs for trade (dealers). Furthermore,
two free parameters in random search models, the surplus-division rule and the meeting
technology, will be determined in equilibrium in our framework.8 In fact, we show that
both of these two parameters will be heterogeneous across agents endogenously.9
One technical contribution of this paper is that it applies the matching literature to
a dynamic trading environment.10 The dynamic framework is important for two reasons.
First, it allows us to analyze asset allocations and prices over time and across traders
of di↵erent centrality. More importantly, the number of periods that a trader actively
contacts a counterparty, instead of staying in autarky, resembles the number of trading
links that a trader builds (i.e., his trading rate in equilibrium). In other words, the model
predicts which traders will become the most connected.
Hence, this dynamic framework of pairwise matching also provides a new and tractable
approach to studying network formation (see Jackson (2005)[27] for a detailed literature
review). Regarding the literature in this line, our framework is related to the ones that
study network formation in asset markets (e.g., Babus and Hu (2015)[9], Hojman and
Szeidl(2008)[24], Gale and Kariv(2007)[19], and Farboodi (2014)[18]). These frameworks
focus on di↵erent frictions and predict di↵erent trading structures.11 We are the first
paper that explains the existing core-periphery structure with multi-layered hierarchy as
a robust feature of many interbank markets. And the novel prediction is that financial
7Although we do not explicitly model bank size, one can interpret large banks as having a more diver-
sified portfolio and therefore having less exposure to their preference shocks. We detail this connection
in Section 6.1.
8In Section 4, we further compare the empirical implications between our model and random search
models.
9Our model thus provides a micro-foundation for Neklyudov (2014)[34], which analyzes an environment
in which traders are endowed with heterogeneous search technologies in a random search framework.
10Most works in this vein are mostly static. One notable exception is Corbae et al. (2003)[14], who
introduce directed matching to the money literature in a setting without heterogeneity ex ante. They
use it to study the relationship between trading history and matching decisions.
11Both Babus and Hu (2015)[9] and Hojman and Szeidl(2008)[24] predict a star structure in order to
overcome information frictions and minimize the cost of building links. Farboodi (2014)[18] looks at the
interbank lending market and considers two types of agents: banks that make risky investments over-
connect, and banks that mainly provide funding end up with too few connections as a result of bargaining
frictions.
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institutions that have lower exposure to risk become the core of a network endogenously.
Moreover, in spite of the network structure, our dynamic framework is very tractable and
admits an analytical solution.
2 Basic Model: One Round of Trade
We start with a basic model with one round of trade to explain the main mechanism
behind the sorting on volatility, and extend it to a dynamic setting in Section 3. All
omitted proofs can be found in the appendix.
2.1 Setup
Preferences: There are two periods (t = 0, 1). There is a continuum of risk-neutral traders
of total measure 1 who are indexed by a type   2 ⌃ = [ L,  H ], which is exogenously
given and publicly observable. The function G( ) denotes the measure of traders with
types weakly below  . There is one divisible asset. At t = 0, all traders are endowed with
A units of this asset and unlimited numeraire goods (i.e., traders have deep pockets).
Asset holdings of all traders are observable and restricted to the [0, 2A] interval.
The utility of a trader at period 1 is given by "v a + ⌧ , where "
v
  denotes the trader’s
marginal utility over the dividend, a denotes his asset holdings, and ⌧ denotes the transfer
he receives at period 1. The marginal utility, "v , is realized at the beginning of period 1
and is given by
"v  =
(
y +  , if v = H
y    , if v = L
where y    H and v is a trader-specific random variable that takes the value v = {L,H}
with equal probability at t = 1. The type   there represents the volatility of a trader’s
marginal utility and thus his exposure to uncertainty. The heterogeneity in exposure is
meant to capture the fact that financial institutions may di↵er in terms of their diversifi-
cation driven by di↵erent business models: the one who holds a more diversified portfolio
has a lower exposure to risk and thus fewer needs for risk sharing.12
The basic environment here assumes that each trader receives an i.i.d. preference
shock. In general, our model allows for the correlation of preferences across traders by
12In Section 6.1, we show the mapping between the volatility type and the degree of the diversification
of a financial institution. An institution with a portfolio that concentrates on certain assets has a higher
exposure to risk. On the other hand, a bank who has a more diversified portfolio has fewer risk-sharing
needs and therefore e↵ectively has a more stable marginal utility over a particular asset.
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imposing more structure on traders’ preferences, which is specified in Section 2.4. For now,
to establish our result more generally, we use the parameter p to denote the probability
that traders in a pair have opposite preference realizations; hence, p = 12 is the special case
with no correlation, and we directly derive our result for any given parameter p below.
Trading decisions: At the beginning of period 0, each trader chooses to match with
another trader based on the observable characteristics. The observable characteristics
include preference volatility, asset holdings, and the correlation of realized preferences.
When two traders agree to form two-person partnerships, they agree on the trading con-
tract that specifies the asset allocation and transfers contingent on the realized preference
at t = 1.
The key assumption here is that traders observe the realized preference of their coun-
terparties only if they choose to match with each other. Such an assumption explicitly
captures the information friction in decentralized markets: traders do not know perfectly
who their best counterparties are in terms of their exact valuation over the asset unless
they contact each other, which is also the basic idea behind search frictions.
Our setup thus captures two distinct features of the OTC market: (1) bilateral trade
and (2) information friction. The combination of these two features generates the under-
lying frictions. The frictionless benchmark would be either of the following: (1) trading
takes place in a centralized market and, therefore, there is no need to search for a counter-
party, or (2) trading takes place in a decentralized trading environment where traders’
realized preferences are observable so that everyone knows where the “right” counterparty
is. In either case, the market implements the first-best allocation: traders with high real-
izations end up with 2A units of assets, and traders with low realizations sell their assets.
Therefore, we deviate from a frictionless environment in a minimum way.
2.2 Equilibrium Definition
Denote the observable characteristics of a trader to be z, and let Z represent the set of
observable characteristics. The basic model with only one-dimensional heterogeneity (i.e.,
volatility of preference) is designed to highlight the key economics in our model. Hence,
one can set z =   in this simple case; z in general represents all possible observable
characteristics, which would play a role in our full model. Denote the contract in a match
between a trader with observable type z and a trader with observable type z0 to be  (z, z0).
The contract is a collection of the terms of trade contingent on the preference realizations
of the traders in the match, which specifies the asset allocation ↵ ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) and
the transfer ⌧ ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) to type-z trader, when the preference realizations of type-
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z trader and type-z0 trader are v and v0, respectively. Denote C as the set of feasible
contracts within the pair. Let W (z, ) denote the expected value for trader z when he is
matched with trader z0 and uses contract  to trade:
W (z, (z, z0)) = Ev,v0 ["v ↵ ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) + ⌧ ((v, z) , (v0, z0))] .
The maximized joint payo↵ with the pair-(z, z0), denoted by ⌦(z, z0), is solved by a payo↵-
maximizing contract,
⌦(z, z0) = max
 2C
{W (z, (z, z0)) +W (z0, (z, z0))} .
Let f(z, z0) denote the measure of the pair (z, z0). Hence, if f(z, z0) = 0, we say that
agents z and z0 are not paired.
Our basic model with one round of trade can be understood as a one-sided matching
model. As is standard in the literature, we use the pairwise stability as our solution
concept.
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a payo↵ function W ⇤(·) : Z! R+, an allocation function
f : Z⇥Z [ {;} ! R+, and terms of trade  ⇤(·, ·) : Z ⇥ Z ! C satisfying the following
conditions:
1) Optimality of traders’ matching decisions. For any z 2 Z and z0 2 Z [ {;} such
that f(z, z0) > 0,
z0 2 arg max
z˜2Z[{;}
{⌦(z, z˜) W ⇤(z˜)} ,
W ⇤(z) = max
z˜2Z[{;}
{⌦(z, z˜) W ⇤(z˜)} , (1)
where W ⇤(z) = W (z, ⇤(z, z0)) with  ⇤(z, z0) 2 argmax 2C W (z, )+W (z0, ) if z0 6= {;},
and ⌦(z, {;}) W ⇤({;}) is the trader’s payo↵ without trade.
2) Feasibility of the allocation function:
ˆ
f(z, z˜)dz˜ + f(z, {;}) = h(z), for all z 2 Z,
where h(z) is the density function of z.
Condition (1) states that, taking other traders’ payo↵s as given, a trader chooses his
trading partner optimally. If a type-z trader chooses to match with no one, we use a
null set {;} to denote such a choice. Hence, if a type-z trader chooses to match with a
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type-z0 trader, he expects to get no higher payo↵ by choosing a trader of a di↵erent type,
z˜, while making the alternative match weakly better o↵ by promising her W ⇤(z˜). This
condition makes sure that traders does not benefit from pairwise joint deviation, which
is essentially the no-blocking condition. The second condition is about the feasibility of
the allocation, where h(z) = dG( ) in the basic model.
2.3 Matching Outcome
Since it is known that, with transferable utility, the matching outcome must maximize
aggregate output, we first look at the matching outcome that implements the e cient allo-
cation subject to the underlying frictions. Then, we characterize transfers, or equivalently,
transaction prices per trade volume, in the trading rules that implement the allocation in
equilibrium.
Given any matching allocation, asset allocations between traders in a match maximizes
their joint payo↵ in a constrained e cient allocation. So, assets should be allocated to
the agent with a higher realized valuation up to his asset holding capacity. Hence, the
asset allocation that maximizes the joint surplus must reflect the preference of the more
volatile type within the pair: the more volatile type receives the asset whenever he has
a high realization and sells the asset whenever he has a low realization, regardless of the
preference of the less volatile type. As a result, compared with the frictionless benchmark,
the more volatile type within a pair always reaches his e cient allocation, whereas the less
volatile type might not, and he would need to take on the cost of misallocation. Formally,
given the trading surplus for each possible state is
  "v    "v0 0  A, the expression for the
expected joint payo↵ is given by
⌦( ,  0) = A [p ( 0 +  ) + (1  p) | 0    |] +W0( ) +W0( 0), (2)
where the first term represents the expected trading surplus, and the second term repre-
sents traders’ autarky value, denoted as W0( ). With probability p, these two traders are
on the opposite sides, implying a larger di↵erence in the preference
  "v    "v0 0   = ( 0 +  )
and hence a higher trading gain. With probability (1  p), they have similar preferences
and hence a lower trading gain.
The following lemma establishes the key property of this joint output function, which
implies that ⌦( ,  0) is weakly submodular on ⌃2.13
13That is,
⌦(a) + ⌦(b)   ⌦(a
_
b) + ⌦(a
^
b).
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Lemma 1 Let  4    3 >  2    1, for any p < 1,
⌦( 4,  3) + ⌦( 2,  1) < ⌦( 4,  1) + ⌦( 3,  2) = ⌦( 4,  2) + ⌦( 3,  1).
Proof. [⌦( 4,  3) + ⌦( 2,  1)]  [⌦( 4,  1) + ⌦( 3,  2)] =  2A(1  p)( 3    2) < 0.
The intuition is the following: within any pair, one of the two might not reach the
first best with some probability. Since  4 and  3 have a higher need for trade, it would
be more costly if one of them failed to reach the optimal allocation. As a result, the
matching outcome that maximizes the aggregate surplus is to match both of them with
more stable types separately. In this way, the total loss is minimized because it is less
costly for  2 and  1 to take on the misallocation. In other words, the more stable types
have a comparative advantage to act as a “market maker” by always taking the opposite
position of “customers.” Although the market maker himself might not need to trade, and
even though customers can reach a higher pairwise surplus with other customers, trading
through market makers minimizes the uncertainty of the preference shocks in the economy,
and such matching outcomes are always e cient. On the other hand, if the information is
perfect (which is the case in which preference shocks are perfectly negatively correlated),
this economy e↵ectively has no uncertainty. This explains why Lemma 1 holds whenever
preference shocks are not perfectly negatively correlated.
With transferable utility, it is perhaps well known that equilibrium allocation f must
support e cient matching, which leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The matching function f must satisfy the following conditions: if f( ,  0) >
0 and f( ˆ,  ˆ0) > 0, max( ,  0) + max( ˆ,  ˆ0) =  4 +  3, where  i is the ith order statistic
of { ,  0,  ˆ,  ˆ0}.
Corollary 1 There exists  ⇤ 2 [ L,  H ] such that f( ,  0) = 0 for each ( ,  0) 2 ⌃C ⇥⌃C
and ( ,  0) 2 ⌃M ⇥ ⌃M , where ⌃M = [ L,  ⇤] and ⌃C = [ ⇤,  H ].
Given Lemma 1, the e cient allocation must satisfy the cuto↵ rule, that is, there
exists  ⇤ such that a trader above the cuto↵      ⇤must match with a trader below
the cuto↵, and the asset allocation always reflects the realized preference of a customer
     ⇤ within the pair. Clearly, the additive nature of the payo↵ implies that there is no
complementarity between customers and market makers. That is, as long as customers
trade with market makers, it does not matter which market maker they choose. Intuitively,
the loss of aggregate surplus comes from the fact that market makers might not reach their
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optimal allocation. Such loss is independent of which customers they match. Hence, there
is no gain from any sorting between customers and market makers.14 With Corollary 1,
the joint payo↵ of a matched pair defined in equation (2) can be conveniently rewritten
as
⌦( c,  m) = A [ c + (2p  1) m] +W0( c) +W0( m), (3)
where  c 2 [ ⇤,  H ] and  m 2 [ L,  ⇤].
This one-sided matching problem can then be reduced to the standard assignment
model with a two-sided market: the additional payo↵ gained by trader   is exactly his
contribution to the surplus within the match, given his optimal assignment in equilibrium.
According to equation (3), conditional on customer  c matching with market maker  m,
the marginal contribution of a customer is given by ⌦ c( c,  m) = A, whereas the marginal
contribution of a dealer is represented by ⌦ m( c,  m) = (2p  1)A. This then explains
the shape of the equilibrium payo↵ function W ⇤( ) established below.
Proposition 2 For any p < 1, a unique equilibrium payo↵ W ⇤( ) is given by
W ⇤( ) =
(
W ⇤( ⇤) + (2p  1)A(     ⇤) + ´   ⇤ W 00( ˜)d ˜ 8  2 [0,  ⇤]
W ⇤( ⇤) + (     ⇤)A+ ´   ⇤ W 00( ˜)d ˜, 8  2 ( ⇤,  H ]
W ⇤( ⇤) = Ap ⇤ +W0( ⇤),
where  ⇤ solves
´  ⇤
0 dG( ˜) =
´  h
 ⇤ dG( ˜).
15
2.4 Correlation of Preferences across Traders
In this subsection, we rationalize the correlation of the volatility of preferences across
agents by introducing an additional dimension of observable heterogeneity. Traders are
divided into two groups with the same population and distribution of volatility types,
labeled by k 2 {R,B}. We assume the following preference structure so that the cross-
group correlation is more negative than the within-group correlation. The group identity
is observable. Intuitively, traders would always prefer to match across groups; hence,
this two-dimensional sorting problem can be reduced to the one-dimensional sorting on
volatility established in our basic model by setting the parameter p in the basic model
14Note that because of the linear preference and the weak submodularity of ⌦( , 0), it is expected that
NAM is an equilibrium outcome, but not the unique (See, for example, Legros and Newman (2002)[30]).
15In our basic case with i.i.d. shocks, the autarky value is independent of types, W0( ) =
1
2 (y+  )A+
1
2 (y    )A = yA, hence, W 00( m) = W 00( c) = 0. Nevertheless, in general, W0( ) can be type dependent,
as shown in Section 2.5.
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to be the probability that two traders have the opposite position across groups. Assume
that traders’ specific shocks in each group k 2 {R,B} is given by
viR =
(
V, with Prob  ,
vi, with Prob 1   ,
viB =
(
⇠ V, with Prob  ,
vi, with Prob 1   ,
where V and vi are uncorrelated random variables and they all take value {H,L} with
equal probability. The variableV is an aggregate shock while vi is idiosyncratic, and we
assume that the realization of the aggregate shock V is publicly observable. The variable⇠
V takes the opposite realization compared with V . Group R has positive exposure to the
aggregate shock and group B has negative exposure. Probability   represents the intensity
of the exposure to the aggregate shock in each group.
Since agents in di↵erent groups have the opposite exposure to the aggregate shock,
valuations of agents across groups are negatively correlated while within-group valuations
are positively correlated. As a result, matching across groups leads to a higher trading
surplus. This immediately implies that traders must match with traders from the other
group in equilibrium. This two-dimensional sorting problem can then be reduced to
the one-dimensional sorting on volatility established in our basic model by setting the
parameter p = Pr(vR 6= vB) = ⇡HR ⇡LB + ⇡HR ⇡LB = ⇡2 + (1   ⇡)2, where ⇡vk denotes the
probability that a trader in group k has valuation v and ⇡ ⌘ ⇡HR = (1  ⇡HB ) = 1+ 2 .
2.5 Implementation by Bid and Ask Price
In this subsection, we implement the contract by a spot transaction contract, which
specifies the transaction price for each unit of assets and total trade volume. Recall that
matching must be across groups and the type with less volatility can be interpreted as a
maker maker, who buys or sells only based on his customer’s valuation.
In the basic model, every trader has A units of asset (i.e., ac = am = A). Therefore,
the trade volume between a market maker of type ( m, k) and a customer of type ( c, k0)
is always A, and the asset always goes to the trader with a higher realization. The
equilibrium transfer, ⌧ ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) , between the market maker and the customer can
then be interpreted as bid and ask prices. Note that, since the matching outcome suggests
that customers must trade with market makers but it does not matter which market maker
they choose, it implies that all market makers must be charging the same expected spread
in equilibrium. Hence, with this implicit knowledge, we look for bid and ask prices that
are independent of the volatility type of the market maker.
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A trader who chooses to be a market maker commits to selling to his customer at the
ask price, which in general can be contingent on his own realization v and is denoted by qvak .
Similarly, the price that the market maker in group k is willing to pay his customer is called
the bid price, denoted by qvbk . Since we assume that a trader is committed to the contract
before preference realization, what matters for their decisions is the expected bid and
ask price, qak ⌘
P
v2{L,H} ⇡
v
kq
va
k and q
b
k ⌘
P
v2{L,H} ⇡
v
kq
vb
k . The commitment assumption,
however, can be further relaxed by looking for the price schedule{(qvak , qvbk ), (qvak0 , qvbk0 )} that
also satisfies traders’ ex post incentives, which is given below. For any k 2 {R,B},and
v 2 {H,L},
qHak = y +  
⇤, qLak = q
Hb
k = y, q
Lb
k = y    ⇤.
Intuitively, a market maker with a high valuation is less willing to sell; hence, he charges
a higher asking price, in this case qHak > q
La
k . The fact that q
Ha
k = y +  
⇤ ensures that
all market makers     ⇤ are willing to sell even if they have a high valuation. Similarly,
a market maker with a low valuation is less willing to buy, implying a lower bid price,
qLbk > q
Hb
k . The expected spread, Sk = q
a
k   qbk, compensates the trader for being a market
maker, who takes on the misallocation from a customer. One can easily see that the above
price schedule implements the unique payo↵ established in Proposition 2.
3 Dynamic Model: Multiple Rounds of Trade
In this section, we extend the basic model to a dynamic setting with N rounds of trade.
By allowing multiple rounds of trade, the model generates endogenous intermediation,
where certain traders end up buying and selling assets for multiple rounds and forming
multiple trading links. As in the basic model, the key decision is the traders’ matching
decision. The only di↵erence is that traders now choose with whom to connect for each
round of trade as well as the number of traders to connect with. That is, both the trading
links as well as the number of links for each trader are determined in equilibrium.
3.1 Extended Setup and Equilibrium Definition
To fix ideas, one can think of our model as a intraday trading game. With N rounds of
trade, a trading day is divided into N subperiods. The maximum number of trades, N ,
captures the underlying friction that prevents traders from connecting with an infinite
number of traders.
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Traders enjoy a flow value from holding an asset each period, which is given by "˜ tat
and t > 0. One can think of the asset as producing t units of dividend in each period.
Let  = 1N denote the duration of a subperiod. The discount factor for the dynamic model
is then given by   = e r , where r is the daily interest rate. We allow for an arbitrary
payo↵ structure of the asset, and the present value of total dividend is normalized to one,PN
t=1  
tt = 1.
To simplify the characterization of the asset distribution over time, we assume that
traders can hold either 0 assets or A assets in our dynamic setting. The initial asset
distribution is symmetric across groups: one-half of the traders in group k are endowed
with A assets and the other half with 0 assets.
At t = 0, traders make their matching decisions and agree on the terms of trade for N
periods. A trader of type ( , k) chooses his trading partner for each period contingent on
his asset holdings, at 2 {0, A}, based on the observable characteristics of the counterpar-
ties, which include the volatility type ( ), asset holdings (at 2 {0, A}), and to which group
the trader belongs. So, the space of observable types is given by Z =
P⇥{0, A}⇥{R,B}.
Note that, in the static model, asset holding does not play a role, because all traders have
the same endowment to begin with. In the dynamic model, traders might have di↵erent
asset positions over time, depending on their trading histories. The fact that we allow
for the trading decision to be contingent on asset holding implies that we assume asset
positions are observable to the market. That is, when a trader has 0 units of assets at
period t, he would only contact a trader with A units of assets. In this way, consistent
with the basic model, the only uncertainty in this economy is the realized preferences of
traders.16
We now introduce the notation for the gain from trade function in this dynamic setting.
The joint payo↵ for traders (z, z˜) who agree on the terms of trade  t(z, z˜) is given by
⌦ˆt(z, z˜, t(z, z˜)) =
X
v,v˜
⇡vt (z)⇡
v˜
t (z˜)
 
t
⇥
"v ↵t ((v, z) , (v˜, z˜)) + "
v˜
 ˜↵t ((v˜, z˜) , (v, z))
⇤
+ 
h
W vt+1 (↵t ((v, z) , (v˜, z˜)) ,  , k) +W
v˜
t+1
⇣
↵t ((v˜, z˜) , (v, z)) ,  ˜, k˜
⌘io
,
where (1) ⇡vt (a,  , k) : Z ! [0, 1] represents the probability of a trader ( , k) who has
16If matching decisions cannot be contingent on asset holdings, this will simply introduce additional
uncertainty into the economy in the sense that traders cannot realize the gain from trade either because
neither of them have assets or because both of them have reached their capacity. By assuming asset
positions are observable, we omit this additional uncertainty. Since we assume that asset position is
observable, the asset position could potentially be used as a signaling device. To assume away this
additional complexity, we maintain the restriction on the asset holding at 2 {0, A}.
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valuation v 2 {H,L}, conditional on he ending up with a units of asset at period t. Since
traders cannot observe others’ valuation until making the contact, this probability is given
by the ex ante distribution prior to trading at period 1: ⇡v1(a,  , k) = ⇡
v
k. From any period
onward t   2, this probability is determined by the trading history and the evolution of
asset distribution; (2) W vt+1(a,  , k) denotes the continuation value of trader-( , k) with
valuation v 2 {H,L} who ended up with a 2 {0, A} units of assets at the beginning of
next period, which depends on traders’ trading decision next period in the equilibrium
path. If a trader z chooses to match with trader z˜ at period t (i.e., ft(z, z˜) > 0) and
agrees on the contract  t(z, z˜),
W vt (a,  , k) =
8>><>>:
P
v˜2{L,H} ⇡
v˜
t (z˜) [t"
v
 ↵t ((v, z) , (v˜, z˜))
+⌧t ((v, z) , (v˜, z˜)) +  W vt+1 (↵t ((v, z) , (v˜, z˜)) ,  , k)
⇤
, if 9z˜ 2  (f(z, ·)),
"v at +  W
v
t+1 (at,  , k) , if ; =  (f(z, ·)).
The gain from trade function ⌦t(z, z˜) is then given by ⌦t(z, z˜) = max 2C(z,z˜) ⌦ˆt(z, z˜, ).
And a trader’s expected payo↵, given contract  t(z, z˜), isWt(z, t(z, z˜)) =
P
v ⇡
v
t (z)W
v
t (z) .
At period 0, a trader ( , k) chooses his optimal trading partner z˜ for each period to
maximize his expected payo↵ contingent on the asset position at 2 {0, A}, taking the
equilibrium payo↵ function W ⇤t (z˜) as given. Formally, the equilibrium is defined below:
Definition 2 Given the initial distribution ⇡v1(a,  , k), an equilibrium is a payo↵ function
W ⇤t (·) : Z ! R+, an allocation function ft(z, z0) : Z ⇥ Z [ {;} ! R+, terms of trade
 ⇤t (·, ·) : Z ⇥ Z ! C for all t 2 {1, . . . , N}, probability of preferences ⇡vt (·) : Z ! [0, 1],
such that the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) Optimality of traders’ matching decisions. For any z 2 Z and z0 2 Z [ {;} such
that ft(z, z0) > 0,
z0 2 arg max
z2Z[{;}
⌦t(z, z˜) W ⇤t (z), (4)
W ⇤t (z) = max
z˜2Z[{;}
⌦t(z, z˜) W ⇤t (z˜), (5)
where W ⇤t (z) = Wt(z, 
⇤(z, z0)) with  ⇤t (z, z
0) 2 argmax 2C(z,z0)Wt(z, ) + Wt(z0, ) if
z0 6= {;}, and ⌦t(z, {;}) W ⇤t ({;}) is the trader’s payo↵ without trade.
(2) The laws of motion of ⇡vt (z):
⇡vt+1(z) =
ht+1 (v, z)P
v˜2{L,H} ht+1 (v˜, z)
, (6)
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where ht+1 (v, z) : {L,H} ⇥ Z ! R+represents joint density function of type-z traders
with valuation v next period, which is given by
ht+1 (v, a,  , k) =
X
aˆ
⇡vt (aˆ,  , k)
8<:
ˆ
z0
X
v02{H,L}
⇡v
0
t (z
0)Pr [↵t ((v, aˆ,  , k) , (v0, z0)) = a]
ft (z
0, (aˆ,  , k)) dz0
)
, (7)
where ↵t ((v, aˆ,  , k) , (v0, z0)) is given  ⇤t (z, z
0).
(3) Feasibility of the allocation function.
ˆ
z˜2Z
ft(z, z˜)dz˜ + ft(z, {;}) =
X
v
ht (v, z) , for all z 2 Z, t 2 {1, . . . , N}, (8)
where h1 (v, a,  , k) =
1
2⇡
v
1(a,  , k)g( ) and ht (v, a,  , k) is given by 7.
Equilibrium conditions (1) and (3) are in the same spirit of the static model. In
particular, equation (5) implies that there is no profitable pairwise joint deviation for any
period t in an equilibrium, where W ⇤t (z) represents the expected value of trader z.
Condition (2) describes the evolution of the distribution of preference types condi-
tional on observable characteristics. Consider a trader of type (aˆ, , k) with valuation v
who matches with a trader of type z0. The probability that this trader has asset posi-
tion a in the next period depends on the preference realization of his counterparty, v0,
which is given by
P
v02{H,L} ⇡
v0
t (z
0)Pr {↵t ((v, aˆ,  , k) , (v0, z0)) = a}. Hence, the integral,´
z0
P
v0
 
⇡v
0
t (z
0)Pr {↵t ((v, aˆ,  , k) , (v0, z0)) = a}
 
ft (z0, (aˆ,  , k)) dz0, represents the proba-
bility that a trader of type (aˆ, , k) with valuation v switches to asset position a next
period, given all the matching decisions ft (z0, (aˆ,  , k)) . Since at any period t, a trader
of type ( , k) can have two asset positions, the distribution function ht+1 (v, a,  , k) :
{L,H} ⇥ Z ! R+ is the summation over these two asset positions aˆ 2 {0, A} with the
weight ⇡vt (aˆ,  , k) on position aˆ.
3.2 Constrained E cient Allocation
The planner maximizes the total surplus by choosing (1) the matching rule for each
period matching rule ft conditional on observable information and (2) asset allocation
↵t ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) within each match, subject to the same constraint in decentralized mar-
16
kets:
⇧ ⌘ max
{ft,↵t}Nt=1
NX
t=1
 tt
X
v,v02{L,H}
ˆ ˆ h
⇡vt (z)"
v
 ↵t ((v, z) , (v
0, z0))
+⇡v
0
t (z
0)"v
0
 0↵t ((v
0, z0) , (v, z))
i
ft(z
0, z)dzdz0, (9)
subject to constraints (6)⇠(8) and ↵t ((v, z) , (v0, z0)) + ↵t ((v0, z0) , (v, z)) = A.
In general, the planner wants to allocate assets from the trader with low valuation to
the one with higher valuation, in order to maximize the total payo↵. However, because of
the underlying frictions, bilateral trade and information frictions, misallocation of assets
is unavoidable. Hence, the constrained e cient allocation simply minimizes the overall
misallocation. Note that, although the matching decision is multidimensional in our
setting, Z =
P⇥{R,B} ⇥ {0, A}, it is neither optimal to match traders within groups
(since across-group matching implies a higher surplus) nor optimal to match traders with
the same asset position (since there is no trading surplus). Hence, the matching problem
can be reduced to a one-dimensional problem in which the key variable is the volatility
type.
In the Appendix, we show that the planner’s problem can then be reduced to choosing
which traders to reach the first-best allocation in each period. The measure of traders who
can reach their e cient allocations in each period is constrained by bilateral matching.
In other words, among traders with misallocated assets, at most half of them can reach
e cient allocations, at the cost of having the other half undertake the misallocation. Since
it is less costly for the stable types to take on the misallocation, it is e cient to have the
more stable types match with the more volatile types. By doing so, the more volatile
types are then guaranteed to reach their e cient allocations earlier. Once a trader has
reached the first best, he remains inactive afterward (since there is no gain from trade).
The total expected output of a trader who reached his first-best allocation at period t
(and stays inactive afterward) can then be expressed as
#( , k, t) ⌘
t 1X
s=1
 ss⇡
H
k (y + (2⇡
H
k   1) )A+
NX
s=t
 ss⇡
H
k (y +  )A.
The following proposition establishes the property of the constrained e cient allocation,
which shows that traders with larger gains from trade reach their e cient allocations
earlier, and the most stable types stay until the end and face asset misallocations. The
formal proof is left to the appendix.
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Proposition 3 The solution to the social planner’s problem {ft,↵t} must satisfy the
following conditions:
The expected output of a trader ( , k) is given by #⇤( , k) = #( , k, t⇤( , k)), where the
last period of a trader-( , k) that remains active is given by
t⇤( , k) = t ,   2 ( ⇤t ,  ⇤t 1] (10)
and t⇤( , k) = N + 1 for     ⇤N . The cuto↵ type  ⇤t is given by G( ⇤t ) = 2 t,and total
welfare is given by ⇧ =
P
k
´
#( , k, t⇤( , k))dG( )2 .
3.3 Equilibrium Characterization
We now characterize the transfers in a decentralized equilibrium that implement the
constrained e cient allocation in Proposition 3. That is, in this equilibrium, at any
period t, two traders are only matched with each other if (i) they are in di↵erent groups,
(ii) they have di↵erent asset holdings, and (iii) a more stable type     ⇤t always matches
with a more volatile type   >  ⇤t . Within the pair, the more stable trader acts as a
market maker, who buys or sells based on the realized valuation of his customer, whereas
the more volatile type acts as a customer, reaches his first-best position and becomes
inactive afterward.
To make sure that a market maker is willing to do so, he must be compensated by the
bid-ask spread. We therefore construct a market-making equilibrium, where the trader’s
payo↵ depends on the role he chooses to play each period and solves for the bid-ask spread
of the market maker in each group, denoted by {(qvakt , qvbkt),(qvak0t, qvbk0t)} such that all traders
follow the optimal matching rule. In theory, by assuming full commitment, one only
needs to solve for the expected transfer (let qbkt ⌘
P
v ⇡
v
kq
vb
kt and q
a
kt ⌘
P
v ⇡
v
kq
va
kt denote
the expected bid-ask prices, respectively) that satisfies traders’ ex ante incentive. Below,
as in the static model (see section 2.5), we solve for the price schedule that also satisfies
traders’ ex-post incentives. That is, with this implementation, the role of market making
is not subject to a commitment problem.
Formally, the role that a trader chooses to play is denoted by ⇢ 2 {m, c, ;}: (i) If a
trader chooses to be a “customer,” ⇢ = c, he keeps the asset if and only if he has a high
realization, pays the ask price charged by the market maker in group k0 if he needs to
buy, and receives the bid price if he needs to sell. (ii) If a trader chooses to be a “market
maker,” ⇢ = m, he trades based on his customer’s valuation at the bid-ask price. (iii)
If a trader chooses to be inactive (⇢ = ;), his asset position remains the same for next
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period. Consider a trader of type ( , k) with valuation v 2 {H,L} who ends up with A
units of the asset, and let Wˆ vt ( , A, k, ⇢) denote his payo↵ when he chooses the role ⇢.
The gain from being a customer relative to being a market maker can be expressed as
 vt (z) ⌘ Wˆt(z, c)  Wˆt(z,m):
 Ht ( , A, k) = A⇡
H
k0
  qHakt + t(y +  ) +  ⇡Hk0  WHt+1( , A, k) WHt+1( , 0, k)  ,
 Lt ( , A, k) = A
⇥
qbk0t  
 
⇡Hk0 q
La
kt + t⇡
L
k0(y    )
 ⇤
+  ⇡Lk0
 
WLt+1( , 0, k) WLt+1( , A, k)
 
,
where W vt+1(z) = max⇢ Wˆ
v
t+1(z, ⇢)). Note that we can express the continuation value of a
trader as W vt+1(z) = max⇢ Wˆ
v
t+1(z, ⇢) because we look for the implementation such that
traders’ ex post incentives are also satisfied.17
The trade-o↵ between acting as a customer and acting as a market maker can be
understood as a trade-o↵ between trading probability and trading prices. When a trader
of type z = ( , A, k) with high valuation (v = H) chooses to be a customer, he simply
keeps the asset; on the other hand, if he chooses to be a market maker, he keeps the asset
only when his customer has a low valuation (at the probability ⇡Lk0) and sells the asset when
his customer has a high valuation (at the probability ⇡Hk0 ). In this case, he loses the asset
and is compensated by the asking price qHakt , which explains the expression of  
H
t ( , A, k).
Similarly, for a trader z = ( , A, k) with low valuation, being a customer implies that he
sells to the market-maker at group k0 at the expected bid price, whereas being a market
maker implies that he sells at the asking price qLakt only when he meets a customer with
high valuation. Hence, with probability ⇡Lk0 , the market maker fails to sell; therefore, the
di↵erence in the continuation value is given by ⇡Lk0
 
WLt+1( , 0, k) WLt+1( , A, k)
 
.
We can derive similar expressions for traders who end up having zero assets at period
t:
 Ht ( , 0, k) =
⇥   qak0t   ⇡Lk0qHbkt  + ⇡Hk0t(y +  )⇤A+  ⇡Hk0  WHt+1( , A, k) WHt+1( , 0, k)  ,
 Lt ( , 0, k) = ⇡
L
k0
⇥
qLbkt   t(y    )
⇤
A+  ⇡Lk0
 
WLt+1( , 0, k) WLt+1( , A, k)
 
.
In this case, being a customer he can always purchase when he has a high valuation by
paying the expected asking price. On the other hand, being a market maker he buys at
the asking price qvakt if and only if his customer has a low valuation. In general, whenever
a trader with high (low) valuation chooses to be a market maker, he does not reach his
first-best allocation with probability ⇡Hk0 (⇡
L
k0), which is the probability that he meets a
17Otherwise, in general, when the role choice is made ex ante, the expression is given by W vt+1(z) =
Wˆ vt+1(z, ⇢
⇤
t+1(z)), where ⇢
⇤
t+1(z) = argmax⇢
P
v ⇡
v
t+1(z)Wˆ
v
t+1 (z, ⇢) .
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customer whose valuation is also high (low).
To make sure that traders follow the matching rule, we solve for bid-ask price {(qvakt , qvbkt),
(qvak0t, q
vb
k0t)} such that, for any t, given the cuto↵ type  ⇤t , this marginal trader is indi↵erent
between being a customer and being a market maker:
 Ht ( 
⇤
t , 0, k) =  
L
t ( 
⇤
t , 0, k) =  
H
t ( 
⇤
t , A, k) =  
L
t ( 
⇤
t , A, k) = 0, (11)
and, with the following claim, we show that all traders   >  ⇤t are strictly better o↵
being a customer, whereas all traders     ⇤t are strictly better o↵ being a market-maker,
regardless of their realized valuation.
Lemma 2  vt ( , a, k) strictly increases with  , and there exists a solution {(qvakt , qvbkt),
(qvak0t, q
vb
k0t)} to 11, which satisfies the following conditions: (1) qakt   qbkt = qak0t   qbk0t ⌘ St;
and (2) St =  ⇤t +
1
2 St+1,where SN = N 
⇤
N .
Lemma 2 then guarantees that, at any period, a trader acts as a market maker if
and only if his volatility type is below the marginal type  ⇤t . A trader who acts as a
customer at period t reaches his first best at that period and become inactive afterward.
The dynamic equilibrium therefore follows a recursive structure and is characterized by a
time-varying cuto↵ that divides customers (relatively volatile types) and market makers
(relatively stable types) in each period. Such a cuto↵ volatility type,  ⇤t , is pinned down
so that all active traders in period t are matched: G( ⇤t ) =
1
2t , for t = 1, . . . , N . The
equilibrium trading links are illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Equilibrium trade links, with 6 rounds of trade. A node represents a trader.
His volatility type is given by the distance from the center to the node. The edge between
two nodes represents the link between two traders.
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As a result, the dynamics has a very simple interpretation. The most volatile types
builds only one trading link with a market maker in the first period, and he behaves
purely as a customer. The most stable types, on the other hand, are the most connected
dealers, who buy and sell over time based on the valuation of their customers each period.
Traders with mid-range volatility act like peripheral dealers in the sense that they serve
customers in earlier periods and then trade with more central dealers.
Expected Payo↵ The ex ante payo↵ of a trader at period 0 (i.e., before the realization
of valuation and asset position) in this constructed market-making equilibrium can be
understood as the sum of his expected asset position plus the total transfer that he has
been receiving or paying over time. When a trader of type ( , k) chooses to be a customer
this period, he pays the expected asking price qak0t if and only if he sells to the customer in
the last period, which happens with probability ⇡Hk0 , and he buys it back this period, which
happens with probability ⇡Hk . Similarly, he receives the expected bid price if and only if he
purchases from the customer in the last period, which happens at the probability ⇡Lk0 , and
he sells this period. Since ⇡ = ⇡Hk = (1  ⇡Hk0 ), this buy-sell probability is therefore given
by ⇡(1 ⇡) and is independent of group k. Hence, for a trader who stays for t periods, he
will act as a market maker for t  1 periods, receiving ⇡(1  ⇡)Pt 1j=1  j(qakj   qbkj)A from
market making, and will become a customer at period t. Once he acts as a customer, he
pays for the expected spread, ⇡(1 ⇡) t(qak0t qbk0t)A, reaches his e cient asset allocation,
and becomes inactive after period t.
Recall that the expected bid-ask spread is independent of the type of group. As a
result, the total net payment of a trader who acts as a market maker for period t   1
and becomes a customer at period t is given by: T (t) ⌘ ⇡(1 ⇡)
⇣Pt 1
j=1  
jSjA   tStA
⌘
.
One can show that the total net payment is increasing in t. Hence, in the constructed
market-making equilibrium, a trader’s ex ante expected payo↵ at t = 0 can be understood
as
W¯ ( , k) = max
t
{#( , k, t) + T (t)} . (12)
That is, the earlier a trader chooses to be a customer, the earlier that he reaches his first-
best position, which implies a higher output (as #( , k, t) is increasing in t) but a lower
net payment (as T (t) is decreasing in t). Clearly, t⇤( , k) ⌘ argmaxt {#( , k, t)) + T (t)}
satisfies Proposition 3. That is, the constrained e cient allocation can be implemented
by letting more stable types receive higher expected revenue from market making and
bear the cost of asset misallocation longer.
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Proposition 4 There exists a decentralized equilibrium that is constrained e cient, where
the expected payo↵ of a trader is given by (12).
Frictionless Limit Compared with the frictionless benchmark, trading frictions in our
model are captured by two factors:
1. Information friction comes from the fact that a trader does not know others’ valua-
tion before making the contact. Hence, the extent of information friction is governed
by the correlation of preferences between two matched traders and is captured by
the probability that traders in di↵erent groups have the opposite position, denoted
by p = ⇡2 + (1   ⇡)2. Information friction therefore vanishes as the correlation
converges to being perfectly negative (i.e., p! 1).
2. A finite number of trading rounds (N) captures the possible trading opportunities
within a day, which captures the technology constraint that prevents a trader from
contacting an infinite number of counterparties.
The total expected payment from customers to market makers (i.e., bid/ask spreads)
compensates the fact that market makers are taking on the misallocation. Hence, the
bid-ask spread converges to zero whenever the cost of misallocation converges to be zero.
This includes the limit cases where (1) the correlation converges to being perfectly negative
or (2) the number of trading rounds converges to infinity so that  N ! 0 and there is
no cost of delay. In both cases, the expected payo↵ of a trader in equation (12) thus
converges to the one in the the frictionless benchmark.
4 Implications for Market Microstructure
In this section, we examine the implications for the volume of trade, asset prices, and the
network structure.
4.1 Trading Activity
The equilibrium trading pattern suggests that a trader with relatively stable preferences
(who does not need to trade ex ante) builds most trading links and intermediates a large
volume of trades. That is, he buys and sells over time. Hence, our model predicts that
trade volume will be concentrated among these traders, who endogenously act as dealers.
To see this, we look at two measures below: trading links and trading volume.
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Trading Links The number of periods that a trader actively contacts a counterparty
(instead of staying in autarky) resembles the number of trading links that he has, denoted
by L( ).18 In equilibrium, a trader of volatility type   2 [ ⇤t ,  ⇤t 1] creates a trading link,
as a market maker with a customer, for each period from period 1 to period t   1. And
for period t, he creates a link as a customer with a market maker, reaching his e cient
allocation and remaining inactive afterward. Hence, for all traders of type      ⇤N , the
number of links e↵ectively maps to the period that a trader has reached his e cient
allocation, which is characterized by equation (10), and the most stable types   <  ⇤N
always build the maximum links N :
L( ) =
8<:t⇤( , k), if   2 [ ⇤N ,  H ]N if   2 [ L,  ⇤N ]. ,
As a result, a trader with more stable preferences builds more links in equilibrium, im-
plying a higher trading rate. In other words, the model endogenously generates a het-
erogeneous meeting rate. Our model thus provides a micro-foundation for Neklyudov
(2014)[34], in which analyzes the environment where traders are endowed with heteroge-
neous search technologies in random search framework.
Trade Volume Developing a trading link does not mean there must be trade only
through a link. At period 1, trades happen only if the one who has a higher valuation
within the pair is not endowed with the asset, which happens with half probability. For
any period t onward, trades happen only if the customer in period t has not yet reached his
e cient allocation. This event happens when this trader sells (purchases) the asset even
when he has a high (low) valuation in the previous period because his customer wants to
buy (sell). Hence, trade happens at probability 2⇡(1   ⇡), which is the probability that
traders in di↵erent groups have the same realization. Hence, the intraday dynamics of
the aggregate trade volume is
Vt =
(
1
2A, if t = 1,
22 t⇡(1  ⇡)A, if t > 1.
In words, the intraday dynamics of trading volume has the following features: (1) over
time, the trading volume decreases, as more assets have been reallocated to traders with
18We omit observable characteristics other than the volatility type in the notation to simplify presen-
tation, because the equilibrium number of trading links does not depend on other observables.
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high preference realization and (2) the trading volume for any period t (i.e., the need for
reallocation) decreases when the preferences of two groups are more negatively correlated.
The cross-sectional behavior, on the other hand, can be understood from the expected
gross trade volume for traders of type  , which is denoted byV( ) and is given by
V( ) =
8<:12A, 8  2 [ ⇤1,  H ],⇥1
2 + 2⇡(1  ⇡)(L( )  1)
⇤
A, 8  2 [ ⇤N ,  ⇤1].
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Figure 2: Trade volume across the preference type of traders, with 10 rounds of trade.
Figure 2 illustrates how gross trade volume depends on the preference type of the
trader. Clearly, being a trader who builds more links implies a higher expected trading
volume, as he buys and sells over time. These two measures then provide predictions on
the distribution of the trading activity. As a result, consistent with Afonso and Lagos
(2014)[3] and Atkeson el al (2014)[7], the distribution is skewed, and only a few traders
intermediate a large amount of trade in equilibrium.19 Moreover, since only the relatively
stable types are building more links, the skewness of the distribution increases when the
trading rounds increase (N). Formally, the distribution of the number of links follows an
exponential distribution:
Measure{  : L( ) = n} =
8<: 12l , if l = 1, . . . , N   1,1
2N 1 , if l = N.
(13)
19Afonso Lagos (2014)[3] shows that, in the federal funds market, the average number of transactions per
bank is typically above 75th percentile throughout the sample. In credit default swap markets, Atkeson et
al. (2014)[7] documented that the top 25 bank holding companies in derivatives trade disproportionately
more than others, and over 95 percent of the gross notional is consistently held by only five bank holding
companies.
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We define the sparsity of network as the ratio of the average number of links over N,
which can be characterized by  (N) =
PN
i=1
i/N
2i +
1
2N .
Lemma 3 The number of trading links follows an exponential distribution characterized
by equation (13). The sparsity of network  (N) is strictly decreasing in N , and the
network becomes more sparse as N increases.
Proof.  (N + 1)   (N) =PNi=1 i/(N+1) i/N2i < 0
4.2 Bid-Ask Prices
In this section, we examine both the time-series and cross-sectional predictions on the
bid-ask prices. Recall that the expected bid and ask price for period-t customers is given
by qbkt =
P
v ⇡
v
kq
vb
kt , q
a
kt =
P
v ⇡
v
kq
va
kt , and the expected spread is the same across groups,
denoted by St.
The time-series behavior of the expected spread is governed by equation (??) and can
be rewritten as
St = 2t 
⇤
t| {z }
benefit from immediacy
+  St+1   St| {z }
change in the net payment
, 8t < N.
Intuitively, two factors are driving the bid-ask spread. The cost of being a customer at
period t is paying the spread, whereas the benefit is reaching e cient allocation earlier
(which is represented by the first term). The second term represents the change in the
net payment: acting as a customer at period t, a trader saves the spread next period, but
he gives up the spread that he would have received as a market maker this period. The
expected spread charged by de facto market makers at period t, St, and changes in the
spread over time, St+1   St, are characterized by the following equations:
St =
NX
s=t
✓
 
2
◆s t
s 
⇤
s , (14)
St+1   St =
NX
s=t+1
✓
 
2
◆s t 1  
s 
⇤
s   s 1 ⇤s 1
   ✓ 
2
◆N t
N 
⇤
N . (15)
We can see that two sets of parameters a↵ect the time series of bid-ask spreads: the
dynamics of the payo↵ structure of the asset (t) and the dynamics of volatility type  ⇤t
of the marginal investor. The dynamics of the payo↵ structure controls the benefit from
immediacy. To see this, we shut down the benefit from immediacy by setting   = 1 and
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t ! 0 and N ! 1. In this environment, there is little benefit from immediacy as long
as a trader can reach his first-best allocation before the end of day. Hence, the total net
payment for any traders except for the most central dealers must be the same. Therefore,
paying the spread St this period must be the same as paying the spread next period and
giving up the spread this period: St ' St+1   St. Hence, the bid-ask spread must be
increasing over time.
On the other hand, when the benefit from immediacy dominates, traders who reach
the first-best allocation earlier should pay for the additional premium for immediacy. For
example, consider the simple case that the asset pays constant dividends for each period
t = ,
St+1   St = 
 
NX
s=t+1
✓
 
2
◆s t 1  
 ⇤s    ⇤s 1
   ✓ 
2
◆N t
 ⇤N
!
< 0.
Since  ⇤s   ⇤s 1, the bid-ask spread is decreasing over time in this case. When immediacy
becomes more valuable, the time series of the expected bid-ask spread shift from an
upward-sloping curve to a downward-sloping curve.
The dispersion of the bid-ask spread also depends on the value of immediacy. Consider,
for example, an increase in the volatility of the economy by moving the distribution of
volatility types from G( ) to G˜( ) = G(     ), with   > 0, and assume t = .
As the economy becomes more volatile, immediacy becomes more valuable. Then, the
di↵erence in the expected spread over two consecutive periods increases from |St+1   St|
to |St+1   St|+
 
 
2
 N t
 .
The time-series pattern of the expected bid-ask spread can be further mapped to the
cross-sectional distribution of the spread across financial institutions of di↵erent centrality.
If the bid-ask spread is increasing in t, it means it is more costly to trade with more central
dealers. This result is then consistent with the findings in Li and Schu¨rho↵ (2014)[32].
But because our paper identifies two factors that drive the bid-ask spread, we also provide
an explanation as to why we might observe di↵erent empirical patterns depending on the
underlying distribution of trading needs in a particular OTC market.
4.3 The Network Structure
The network graph, as in the standard network literature, can be characterized by an
adjacency matrix. However, because the matching decisions at period t are contingent
on asset holdings at the end of period t   1, this dynamic feature of formation implies
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that the trading links of a trader at period t are only determined up to the type-( , k)
at period 0. That is, at period 0, the asset position is e↵ectively a random variable,
and the realization is determined by the trading history. Given the realized positions, an
agent ( , k, 0) meets ( 0, k0, A). We therefore define an adjacency matrix at t = 0 based
on the type ( , k). The proposition shows that, in equilibrium, the number of traders
(nodes) that are connected (i.e., there exists a path connecting two traders) is given by
2N . Denote G as network graph on the set of these connected traders: ij 2 G if there is
a direct trading link between the type i = ( , k) and j = ( 0, k0). The network has the
following tiered structures:
Proposition 5 With N trading rounds, a total population of 2N traders are connected.
The adjacency matrix is G = gN ,
gt =
"
gt 1 I2t 1⇥2t 1
I2t 1⇥2t 1 O2t 1⇥2t 1
#
, 8t > 1, g1 =
"
0 1
1 0
#
, (16)
where dim(G) = 2N , O2N 1⇥2N 1 is a zero matrix, and I2t 1⇥2t 1 is an identity matrix.
In the adjacency matrix, traders acting as customers in the earlier period (i.e., lower
t⇤( , k)) are assigned a higher index. The identity matrix, I2t 1⇥2t 1 , in matrix gt repre-
sents links formed at period N   t+ 1. At period t, traders with an index number lower
than 2t, who are market makers at period t, form links with traders with index numbers
from 2t 1 + 1 to 2t. This sorting result leads to a zero matrix on the lower right corner
of matrix gt, O2t 1⇥2t 1 , which reminds us that customers at period t do not match with
each other at period t.
In the section on financial contagion, we use these properties to further study the
implications for contagion risk in the interbank market.
4.4 Comparison to Random Search Models
In random search frameworks, trading friction is modeled as an exogenous meeting rate
(Du e et al. (2005)[15]), which captures the fact that it takes time to find the “right”
counterparty. Based on this, recent works by Afonso and Lagos (2014)[4] and Hugonnier,
Lester and Weill (2014)[26] further allow for richer heterogeneity, where the valuation of
a counterparty is drawn from a distribution. In their environment, traders with moderate
valuation act as intermediaries because they are more likely to buy and sell given the
distribution that they face. Despite our mechanisms being very di↵erent, several predic-
tions are similar here: (1) misallocation as well as trading volume are concentrated in
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traders with moderate valuation, and (2) allocation converges to the e cient outcome in
the frictionless limit.
Our framework, however, has several di↵erent implications regarding e ciency, trading
structure, and prices. First of all, the fact that we allow for traders to direct their search
and choose whether to be inactive or not reduces the ine cient matching in random search
framework, in which all meetings are possible. This can be seen from two channels: (1)
as established in Proposition 5, our equilibrium structure has a defined tiering, in the
sense that banks in the same tier will never trade with each other. The tier of a trader
is determined by his gain from trade and hence his willingness to wait. Traders who are
more willing to wait take on misallocation from traders in other tiers who need immediacy.
Hence, it is ine cient for a trader to meet with another trader in the same tier, and that
is why it never happens in our environment. (2) In random search frameworks, traders
meet at the same exogenous meeting rate regardless whether they have already reached
their e cient allocations, which by construction generates some crowding e↵ect and thus
“unused” matches. In our framework, on the other hand, two traders meet if and only if
they still have expected gains from trade and only the ones who carry on misallocation
remain active in the market. Traders e↵ectively have di↵erent meeting rate endogenously.
Due to these two channels, the speed of convergence to the e cient allocation is therefore
much slower in a random matching model.
Second, asset prices in a random search framework depends on bargaining power of a
trader, which is a free parameter. On the other hand, prices and thus the surplus sharing
rule are pinned down endogenously in our framework so that it is indeed optimal for
customers to trade with market makers. This force also has di↵erent price implications.
For example, in Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2014)[26], the trading price within a pair
is given by a weighted value of buyers’ and sellers’ reservation value, and such weight is
given by an exogenous bargaining power parameter. A buyer with high valuation then
pays a higher price on average. This, however, is not necessarily true in our model: buyers
with higher valuation are customers in earlier periods, who paid the spread in the earlier
period. In fact, without delay cost, they pay a lower asking price. On the other hand,
a buyer with slightly lower valuation (the peripheral dealer) pays a higher asking price
when he leaves the market but profit from the spreads he charges his customers.
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5 Implication for Systemic Risk
Motivated by the existing (growing) literature on network and financial contagion, we
study the spread of unexpected shocks throughout this highly skewed, interconnected
network.20 The key question in this literature is how shocks propagate in varied en-
dogenously given networks, and existing analytical results focus mostly on a simple and
symmetric network.21 The goal of this section is to analyze the interdependence in our
equilibrium network, which has a highly asymmetric structure and is also consistent with
what we observed in the financial markets. To introduce counterparty risk, we assume
that all payments are made at the end of the trading game. That is, when transfer is
delayed, transactions in our model can now be interpreted as borrowing and lending, or
taking long/short positions of derivatives contracts.
Interpretation of the OTC Market as an Unsecured Lending Market Financial
Institutions (FIs) are di↵erent in terms of their return on investment, which is given by
"v  at the end of period N if they invest A units of capital. At t = 0, all FIs start with the
same amount of outside obligation b to non-financial entities and the same value of total
assets. That is, all FIs start with the same net worth (equity value), which is denoted by
e. They are di↵erent in terms of the composition of their asset holdings at t = 0. Only
half of FIs have A units of capital on hand, and the rest of the assets are illiquid at t = 0.
These FIs can choose to lend the capital to other FIs or invest in their own projects. The
other half of FIs have only illiquid assets so that they can profit from the investment only
if they borrow from other FIs. The trading framework developed here can be applied to
interbank lending, where the asset is now the “capital”, and the transfer is the interest
rate that FIs pay back at the end of period N . Furthermore, an FI receives the return "v 
as long as the investment is made before period N. Hence, in this setting, the flow value
t is given by t ! 0 for all t < N and N ! 1.
The face value of j’s debt to i is thus equal to ⌧jiA, where ⌧ji is given by the bid-ask
price in the trading framework. Given the lending network, let
P
k ⌧kiA denote the in-
network asset of FI i, which are claims on other FIs, and let
P
j ⌧ijA denote the in-network
liabilities of FI i, which represents the payment obligation. The net worth of FI i after
20Studying how counterparty risk with expected shocks changes the network formation is clearly im-
portant but is beyond the scope of this paper.
21See, for examples, [6] and[1], where the network structure is taken as given.
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the trading is then given by
e( , nb, a0, aN) = "
v
 aN +
nsX
k=1
⌧kiA 
nbX
j=1
⌧ijA+ e,
where a0 and aN denote the initial and the final asset position a 2 {0, A}, nb denotes
the number of creditors of FI i, and ns denotes the number of lenders of FIs. Given
an initial position of an FI a0, the final position at the end of day is given by aN =
A (I{a0 = A}+ nb   ns) . In general, the net worth of FI i after the trade depends on the
project return and the net payment (bid-ask spread), which is a function of type- .22 To
simplify the analysis on contagion, we assume that e   A and the net payment coming
from the interest spread is negligible (e   {Pnsk=1 ⌧kiA  Pnbj=1 ⌧ijA}), so that the net
worth of an FI i after the trade is approximately homogeneous e( , n, aN)! e.
5.1 Interconnectedness
According to Proposition 5, the network has the following two features.
1. Maximum connections: Given the trading capacity N, the number of FIs that are
connected in equilibrium is given by 2N .
2. No loop: Any FI that is connected to FI i is no longer connected to FI-j underG ij,
where G  ij denotes the graph obtained by deleting link ij from the existing graph
G.
Both features are important for contagion analysis. The first one clearly establishes
how trading capacity changes interconnectedness. The fact that there is no circle in the
trading network G further simplifies the contagion analysis. Since deleting any link ij in
the trading network G necessarily leads to two disconnected subnetworks, let gi j denote
the subnetwork that includes all the nodes (directly and indirectly) connected to bank
i under G   ij. Hence, any risk arising from a subnetwork gi j a↵ects FIs outside the
subnetwork only through link ij. Similarly, any risk from outside the subnetwork a↵ects
FIs within the subnetwork gi j through the link ij. Such property can be seen clearly from
Figure 3.
22If one takes into account the heterogeneity in  , the expression can be rewritten as e( , n, aN ) =
e+ ("v    y)aN + T ( , k).
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Figure 3: Network graph, with 6 rounds of trade. The size of an FI-node represents the
gross trading volume involving the FI.
Furthermore, consider an FI i with n + 1 links: he acts as a market maker for n
customers and trades with a market maker at period n+1. If we delete the link between
FI i and his market maker (denoted by jm(i)), FI i is then the most connected dealer
in the subnetwork gi ⌘ gi jm(i). The subnetwork centered at FI i can be characterized
recursively. For an FI i with n + 1 links, he will have n customers, and the n customers
have n   1, n   2, ..., 0 customers in turn. Hence, the number of FIs in subnetwork gi
can be solved recursively and is denoted by ⌫n: ⌫n = n+
Pn 1
j=0 ⌫j.
5.2 Contagion
We study contagion triggered by the unexpected loss of an FI in the network. Such
negative shocks can be from investment returns or other outstanding assets of the FI. We
make the following assumptions on defaults: (1) An FI defaults whenever the loss is higher
than its equity value e. (2) Each FI must meet the outside obligation b, which is assumed
to have seniority relative to its liabilities within the network. We look at the shock regime
that an FI can always meet its senior liabilities b so that the loss is only distributed within
the network. (3) There is a deadweight loss z whenever an FI defaults.23
23The deadweight loss can be interpreted as a bankruptcy loss or a liquidation cost. For example,
under a slightly di↵erent formulation, where e is the cash holding of an FI and the only illiquid asset of
an FI is the project created through the credit market, z can be thought of as the liquidation cost of the
illiquid asset.
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Let l0 denote the size of the negative shock that hits the initial distressed FI i, which
will default if l0   e. If the FI has n creditors, each creditor takes a loss of 1n (l0 + z   e).
The default of creditors may trigger further default. As there is no circle in the equilib-
rium network, the prorogation of risks can be characterized easily. The threshold for a
connected FI becoming insolvent is summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 6 The default of the first distressed FI i will induce the default of FI x that
is m links away from FI i if (1) there is a credit chain between FI i and FI x and (2) the
initial loss l0 satisfies the following condition:
l0   e   max{0, ⇣m1 }, (17)
⇣mj = n
j
be  z + nj max{0, ⇣mj+1}, 81  j < m, ⇣mm = nmb e  z, (18)
where njb denotes the number of creditors of the jth FI on the chain, starting from the
first distressed FI and ending at the FI-x.
The proposition shows that two factors are driving the contagion. The first one is the
dilution e↵ect pointed out by Allen and Gale (2000)[6]. When an FI has more creditors,
the burden of any losses is shared among its creditors. This dilutes the loss and its
creditors are less likely to default, leading to less fragility. This shows up in the threshold
for contagion ⇣m1 , which increases with the number of creditors of FIs on the chain. To
see this clearly, let lm denote the loss received by an FI that is m links away conditional
on the event that all creditors before him default, which can be expressed as
lm =
l0
⇧m 1j=0 n
j
b
+
m 1X
j=0
(z   e)
⇧m 1i=j n
j
b
> e.
The corollary below further highlights that the diversifying e↵ect decreases the spread
of risk.
Corollary 2 Consider an initial shock l0 > e that hits FI i. (1) All immediate creditors
remain solvent if and only if nib   l0+z ee , where nib is the number of creditors of FI i.
(2) Rank all immediate creditors by the number of their customers, indexed by c. That is,
nb(c0)   nb(c) for any c0 > c. If no FI defaults in subnetwork gc i, then no FI defaults in
subnetwork gc
0
 i.
The speed at which the negative shock l0 dies out also depends on the excess liquidity
of the defaulting banks, which is captured by z   e. When the default cost (z) is small
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relative to excess liquidity (z < e), each defaulting bank e↵ectively contributes liquidity
to the system, limiting the extent of contagion. On the other hand, consider the other
extreme case in which FIs are highly leveraged and there is a high liquidation cost (i.e.,
z   e); each additional default then brings net loss into the system. Hence, in contrast
to the environment in which contagion will gradually stop as the length of the credit
chain increases, the accrued cost from default keeps the default going along the whole
credit chain. This is reflected in the following corollary, which establishes the condition
under which default will spread along the whole credit chain regardless of the length of
the chain.
Corollary 3 All creditors along a credit chain will default if l0   e and ni  bz/ec for
all creditors along the chain.
One can see how connection matters in the regime when bz/ec is large enough: on
the one hand, a more interconnected system implies more creditors, and a default chain
is therefore more likely to be stopped. That is, the condition is less likely to be satisfied.
On the other hand, when the number of creditors is not large enough to stop the fail-
ure, any additional connection necessarily leads to further loss. In other words, there is
nonmonotonic e↵ect of increasing connections.
5.3 Policy Implications
The nonmonotonic e↵ects of interconnections have been pointed in studies on network
and financial contagion. However, since most studies take the network structure as given,
it remains unclear how the underlying network responds to any policy that aims to change
the underlying connectedness. For example, because of the recent financial crisis, it has
been suggested that the connections of large, interconnected financial institutions should
be reduced.24 However, without knowing the counterfactual network, neither the cost nor
the benefit of reducing connections can be properly analyzed.
Our framework provides a way to analyze such a policy. In particular, a policy that
restricts the number of counterparties can be interpreted as restricting the maximum
trading capacity (N) in our setting. The e↵ect of such a policy can thus be understood
as comparative statics on N. To see the e↵ect of connections on contagion, consider an
increase in trading capacity, (say, N 0 = N + 1).25 Two disjointed subnetworks led by
24“The risk of failure of large, interconnected firms must be reduced, whether by reducing their size,
curtailing their interconnections, or limiting their activities” (Volcker, 2012).
25Stuying policy implications by reducing or increasing interconnectedness is a standard exercise. See,
for example, Section 6 of Garleanu et al. (2013)[20].
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the most central market makers i and j are now connected. The cost of this additional
connection is simply that the risk may spread from subnetwork gi to subnetwork gj.
Without loss of generality, we assume that these two market makers also have the highest
realized number of creditors. When the number of creditors of market maker i is low (so
that ni < bz/ec), the risk travels. In fact, according to Corollary 3, all connected creditors
in both subnetworks default in this case. On the other hand, when the financial network
is more interconnected so that the most central market makers have enough creditors to
diversify the risk exposures, the risk will not travel to subnetwork gj. This can be seen
from Corollary 2, which shows that unless all immediate creditors of FI i default, the
subnetwork centering around FI j remains solvent, as it has the most creditors.
Our framework therefore has immediate policy implications, which is a trade-o↵ be-
tween e ciency and stability. A policy that restricts the number of counterparties leads
to e ciency losses. The marginal losses in e ciency are decreasing with N , since the gain
from trades from the relatively stable types is lower. The e↵ect on stability, on the other
hand, is nonmonotonic: increasing connections creates channels through which shocks
are spread (negative e↵ect) but also has a positive e↵ect by diversifying risk exposures
for individual banks that are a↵ected. When the underlying architecture is densely con-
nected so that the positive e↵ect dominates, restricting the number of counterparties only
decreases welfare. Hence, such a policy could only be optimal when the negative e↵ect
dominates, which happens in an economy in which FIs are highly leveraged (z   e) with
intermediate levels of integration.
6 Discussions/Extension
6.1 Diversification and Heterogeneity in Volatility
Some financial institutions tend to have less diversified asset portfolios, either because of
their focus on a certain geographic location, such as community banks, or because of their
specialization, such as initiators of asset-backed securities. Other financial institutions
tend to have more diversified portfolios, either because they are geographically diversified,
such as large commercial banks, or because of their business models, such as large dealer
banks. In this section, we show that the heterogeneity in volatility can be mapped to
di↵erent levels of portfolio diversification.
Assume that there are two types of illiquid assets. The payo↵s of these two assets are
perfectly negatively correlated. Financial institutions are endowed with di↵erent portfo-
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lios. Normalizing the size of an institution in terms of its illiquid asset holding to be 1,
we denote the portfolio of FI i by a = (!1i,!2i), where !ji denotes its holding of type-j
assets. !1i + !2i = 1, and !1i,!2i > 0. The degree of diversification is then given by
max (!1i,!2i).
The assets are Lucas trees producing dividend goods each period. The dividend of
a type-j asset held by FI i at period t is dkit. FIs can trade a financial contract, which
is a promise to pay one dividend good each period. The payo↵ of an FI at period t is
ut(a1i, a2i,↵t) = (a1i + a2i)U (!1id1it + !2id2it + ↵t) + ⌧t, dkit is the period-t dividend of a
type-k asset held by FI i, ↵t is the FI’s period-t holding of the financial contract, ⌧t is con-
sumption of numeraire goods and U(d) = yd   2
 
d  D¯ 2, where D¯ = 12 [D(H) +D(L)].
D(S) denotes the state contingent dividend payment. D(H) > D(L) > 0. The dividend
flows of an asset at any period are determined at period 0 but after matching decisions
are made:
(d1it, d2it) =
(
(D(V ), D(⇠ V )) with Prob  ,
(D(vi), D(⇠ vi)) with Prob 1   .
V is an aggregate shock and vi is an idiosyncratic shock, V, vi 2 {H,L}. V and ⇠ V are
perfectly negatively correlated, Pr(V =⇠ V ) = 0. The same applies to vi and ⇠ vi. With
this setup, the payo↵ of agent i mimics the general setup with preference correlation in
Section 2.4. The period 0 payo↵ of an FI is
P
t  
t [ut(a1i, a2i,↵t) + ⌧t], where   2 (0, 1) is
a discount factor.
The holding of the financial contracts of any financial institution is restricted to be
between  ⌘ and ⌘, with ⌘ 2 (0, 1), reflecting the trading capacity of an FI. Under this
setup, we can show that the stable matching plan is the same as in our dynamic model,
as long as the trading capacity of FIs is small enough and the metric of diversification,
max (!1i,!2i), maps to the volatility type of a trader.
6.2 Endogenous Trading Capacity
So far, we have taken trading capacity N as given. In this part, we explore how such
capacity is bounded by FIs’ incentive to default strategically in a credit market when
they have limited commitment. We will study secured and unsecured lending separately.
We find that the endogenous network structure and other equilibrium characterization
matter for the trading capacity.
To study strategic default in the unsecured lending market, where repayment depends
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on FIs’ reputation in the market, we extend our model to an infinite-horizon setup, so
that the value of reputation is endogenous. Since FIs borrow on their reputation, the
debt repayment has to be incentive compatible. Denote the period payo↵ at date t
to be W ⇤0t( , k), which is solved in Section 3, taking as given the number of trading
rounds in period t, Nt. Then, the value from participating in the interbank trading is
Vt( , k) =
P1
⌧=t  ˆ
⌧ tW ⇤0t( , k), where  ˆ is the interday discount factor, and the intraday
discount factor used in the game with N subperiods can be expressed as   =  ˆ1/N . With
unsecured lending, FIs’ incentive to repay depends on the value of reputation, which is
other FIs’ belief that the FI will not default. We assume that the reputation of an FI is
public knowledge. If an FI defaults, the FI will be punished collectively to live in autarky
forever. An FI’s continuation value in autarky is U( , k) = y
1  ˆA. For simplicity, we
assume ⇡Hk =
1
2 in this application and focus on a stationary equilibrium.
Denote B( ) as the maximum outstanding debt of an FI of type  . In the equilibrium,
repayment with maximum debt is incentive compatible only if the payo↵ from default,
B( )+ U( , k), is no greater than the value from avoiding default,  V ( ).26 So, incentive
compatibility implies that
B( )   ˆ [V ( , k)  U( , k)] , 8 . (19)
FIs of a low volatility type build up higher debt holding from market-making activities
and have less to gain from participating in the game; the maximum depends on their
incentive to default. Assume without loss of generality that B( ) is increasing with  .
From Section 3, it is easy to show that   [V ( )  U( )] is increasing with  . Therefore,
equation (19) holds if and only if B( L)   ˆ [V ( L, k)  U( L, k)] .
Therefore, the upper bound for the maximum number of trading rounds depends
endogenously on core market makers’ incentive to default and gain from market making.
When the market is less liquid, dealers could increase profit. This gives dealers more
incentive to avoid default and maintain a good reputation. On the other hand, competition
among dealers reduces their profit margin and increases market liquidity. In equilibrium,
a balance is reached between competition, market liquidity, and dealers’ incentive to
maintain their reputation.
The same logic applies to the environment with collateralized lending: FIs’ incentive
to repay depends on the value of the collateral they pledge. Suppose the value of collateral
each FI holds is Q. Then the incentive compatibility constraint implies that B( )  Q, 8 ,
26X denotes the payo↵ from the FI’s asset, which includes lending and investment.
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which imposes an upper bound on trading capacity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we build a dynamic matching model of an over-the-counter market, in which
market-making activities and a tiered core-periphery network emerge endogenously. The
network structure is qualitatively similar to what we observe in a typical OTC market.
The key mechanism behind these results is negative sorting on the volatility of traders’
preferences over assets. Market-making services o↵ered by traders with less volatile pref-
erences insure traders with more volatile preferences against their trading needs, which
could be either selling or buying assets. The model gives us a fresh understanding of the
economics behind the trading patterns in the OTC market. Furthermore, it also o↵ers
new perspectives on the level and distribution of trading costs and the financial stability
of the OTC market.
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A Appendix
A.1 Omitted Proofs
A.1.1 Proof for Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose not, consider an equilibrium where f( 3, 4) > 0 and f( 2, 1) > 0. Note
that equation (1) can be rewritten as: W ⇤( ) +W ⇤( 0)   ⌦( , 0) for 8( , 0). Hence, we have
W ⇤( 4) +W ⇤( 2)   ⌦( 4, 2) and W ⇤( 3) +W ⇤( 1)   ⌦( 3, 1), which implies ⌃W ⇤( j)  
⌦( 4, 2) + ⌦( 3, 1). However, since f( 3, 4) > 0 and f( 2, 1) > 0 implies that W ⇤( 4) +
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W ⇤( 3) = ⌦( 4, 3) and W ⇤( 2) +W ⇤( 1) = ⌦( 1, 2), which in turn implies that ⌃W ⇤( j) =
⌦( 4, 3) + ⌦( 1, 2) > ⌦( 4, 2) + ⌦( 3, 1). Contradiction by Lemma 1.
A.1.2 Proof for Proposition 2
Proof. We now show that the given the constructed payo↵ W ⇤( ), traders’ follow the cuto↵
matching rule in Proposition 1. Define Wˆ ( , 0) ⌘ ⌦( , 0) W ⇤( 0).
Wˆ ( , 0) =
(
A [ 0 + (2p  1) ] +W0( ) +W0( 0) W ⇤( 0), for  0 >  ,
A [  + (2p  1) 0] +W0( ) +W0( 0) W ⇤( 0), for      0.
By construction of W ⇤( ), for any   2 [ ⇤, H ],
@Wˆ ( , 0)
@ 0
=
8><>:
0, for  0 >  ,
[(2p  1)  1]A = 2(p  1)a < 0, for      0    ⇤,
[(2p  1)  (2p  1)]A = 0, for      ⇤ >  0.
Hence, given the continuity of Wˆ ( , 0) and @Wˆ ( , 
0)
@ 0 , argmax 0 Wˆ ( , 
0) 2 [ L, ⇤] for any
  2 [ ⇤, H ]. Similarly, for any   2 [0, ⇤],
@Wˆ ( , 0)
@ 0
=
8><>:
0, for  0    ⇤,
2(1  p)A, for  ⇤    0 >  ,
0, for  ⇤        0.
Hence,argmax 0 Wˆ ( , 0) 2 [ ⇤, H ] for any   2 [0, ⇤]. Lastly, one can see that this payo↵
satisfies the feasible within each pair:
W ⇤( c) +W ⇤( m)
= 2W ⇤( ⇤) + (1  2p)( ⇤    m)A+ ( c    ⇤)A+
ˆ  c
 ⇤
W 00( ˜)d ˜ +
ˆ  ⇤
 m
W 00( ˜)d ˜
= 2{ap ⇤ +W0( ⇤)}+ (1  2p)( ⇤    m)A+ ( c    ⇤)A
= A{ c + (2p  1) m}+W0( c) +W0( m) = ⌦( c, m).
To show the uniqueness of W ⇤( ), the slope of W ⇤( ) is uniquely pin down from @W
⇤( )
@  =
@⌦( , 0)
@  . The level of this function is further pinned down by the payo↵ of the marginal type:
Since the marginal type must be in di↵erent between being a market maker and customer,
W ⇤( ⇤) = 12⌦( 
⇤, ⇤) = Ap ⇤ +W0( ⇤).
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A.1.3 Equilibrium with heterogeneous correlations
Proof. The logic is the same as before, we show that when either of the above conditions
is violated, there is a surplus left and the aggregate surplus can therefore be improved by
rearranging the match. For notational convenience, we use  k to denote type-( , k). First,
consider the case when both conditions are violated. That is, there exists 4R    3R >  2B    1B
such that f( 4R, 
3
R) > 0 and f( 
2
B, 
1
B) > 0:
⌦( 4R, 
3
R) + ⌦( 
2
B, 
1
B) = A
⇥
 4R   (1  2p0) 3R
⇤
+A
⇥
 2B   (1  2p0) 1B
⇤
+
X
j,k
W0( 
j
k)
 A ⇥  4R +  3R   (1  2p0)   2B +  1B ⇤+X
j,k
W0( 
j
k)
< A
⇥ 
 4R +  
3
R
   (1  2p1)   2B +  1B ⇤+X
j,k
W0( 
j
k)
= ⌦
 
 4R, 
2
B
 
+ ⌦
 
 3R, 
1
B
 
= ⌦
 
 4R, 
1
B
 
+ ⌦
 
 3R, 
2
B
 
,
where p0and p1represents the probability that traders have opposite realization within a group
and across groups, respectively. By construction, p0 = 2⇡(1 ⇡) = 1  22 < p1 = ⇡2+(1 ⇡)2 =
1+ 2
2 .
Second, suppose that Proposition 1 is satisfied but certain traders are matched within group.
That is, f( cR, 
m
R ) > 0 and f( 
c
B, 
m
B ) > 0. Given that p1 > p0, ⌦( 
c
R, 
m
R ) + ⌦( 
c
B, 
m
B ) <
⌦ ( cR, 
m
B ) + ⌦ ( 
m
R , 
c
B) . Lastly, consider the case that f ( k, 
0
k) = 0 (that is, traders only
match within each group) but the proposition 1 is not satisfied. Lemma 1 can be applied directly
to this case within each group k. Hence, an allocation f maximizes the aggregate surplus if and
only if Proposition 1 and f ( k, 0k) = 0 are satisfied.
A.1.4 Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. We start the proof by claiming that the allocation within a pair must satisfy mono-
tonicity property. That is, the asset goes to the trader with a higher realization within the pair,
↵t("v
0
 0 , "
v
 ) = A i↵ "
v0
 0   "v . We solve the planner’s problem under this allocation rule and then
verify the claim below. The monotonicity property thus suggests that, after exchanging the asset
within a pair, for  2    1, ⇡Ht+1( 2, A, k0) = 1,⇡Ht+1( 2, 0, k0) = 0, and ⇡Ht+1( 1, a˜, k) = ⇡Ht (z) for
a˜ 2 {0, A}. Given that⇡H0 ( , a˜, k) = ⇡Hk , the probability that a trader owns the asset after the
trade at period t, is therefore given by ⇡Hk0 for trader ( 2, a˜, k
0) and (1 ⇡Hk0 ) for trader ( 1, a˜, k).
As a result, within the pair, the more volatile type ( , k) would reach his e cient allocation,
with the expected payo↵ tA⇡Hk (y +  ). The expected flow surplus for the less volatile type
within the pair is then given by (1  ⇡Hk0 )(y + (2⇡Hk   1) ).
The optimal assignment function ft then e↵ectively determines whether a trader would reach
his e cient allocation at period t. Let⌘t( ) be the index function so that ⌘t( ) = 1 i↵ a trader- 
is assigned e cient allocation at period t and ⌘t( ) = 0 otherwise. The social planner’s problem
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can be rewritten as
⇧ = max
⌘t( )2{0,1},8 2⌃
1
2
X
k
(
NX
t=1
ˆ
 ttA
⇥
⌘t( )⇡
H
k (y +  )
+ (1  ⌘t( ))(1  ⇡Hk0 )(y + (2⇡Hk   1) )
#
g( )d 
)
such that
µ
⇣n
  : ⌘t( )  ⌘t 1( ) = 1, 8  2
Xo⌘
 µ
⇣n
  : ⌘t( ) = 0, 8  2
Xo⌘
,
and for all   2P, µ ({s : ⌘t(s) = 1, s   }) + µ ({s : ⌘t(s) = 0, , s   }) = G( ).27
The first constraint is imposed by pair-wise matching. If a trader switches from having
misallocated assets to having first best allocation for sure in that period, it must be the case
that there is another trader taking on the misallocation from such a trader. Hence, the measure
of traders who switch to first best allocation in that period must be no greater than the measure
of traders who take misallocated assets at the end of that period. The second constraint is the
feasibility constraint.
The following claim shows that if traders of type   receive first best allocation, all traders
with type  0 >   must receive first best allocation.
Claim 1 If ⌘t( ) = 1, then ⌘t( 0) = 1 for  0 >  .
Proof. The flow payo↵ of a trader of type   as a function of ⌘t is proportional to  (⌘t, ) ⌘
⌘t⇡Hk (y +  ) + (1  ⌘t)(1  ⇡Hk0 )(y + (2⇡Hk   1) ). Then,  12(⌘t, ) = ⇡Hk   (1  ⇡Hk0 )(2⇡Hk   1) =
2⇡(1  ⇡) > 0. That is, the value of getting e cient allocation is strictly increasing in  .
Given this claim and the fact that the first constraint is binding, the period that a trader
who reaches his e cient allocation t⇤( , k) as well as the total surplus are then as stated in the
proposition.
Below, we verify that any allocation that violates the monotonicity property only strictly
decreases the surplus.
Claim 2 Any optimal asset allocation within a pair must satisfy the monotonicity property.
Proof. Clearly, the monotonicity property holds for the last period N for any matching plan.
Suppose that the monotonicity property within any pair ( 0, ) holds for period t + 1 for any
matching plan. We now show that given any matching plan in period t, the monotonicity prop-
erty holds within a pair. Consider an alternative allocation rule for two agents of type ( 2, A, k0)
and ( 1, 0, k) respectively, which gives the conditional distribution of preference type to be
⇡ˆHt+1( 2, A, k
0)  1 and ⇡ˆHt+1( 2, 0, k0)   0, and ⇡ˆHt+1( 1, a˜t, k0)   0. Let  ˆt( , k) denote the prob-
ability that a trader of type ( , k) owns the asset after the trade at period t under this allocation
27⌘0( ) = 0, for all   2
P
.
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rule. Any arbitrary allocation rule must satisfy  ˆt( , k)⇡ˆHt+1( , A, k)+(1  ˆt( , k))⇡ˆHt+1( , 0, k) =
⇡Ht (z).
Any allocation that violates the monotonicity property strictly decreases the flow surplus at
the period t. What is left to show is that the social surplus next period under such deviation is
also weakly lower than the one without deviation. Let fˆt+1 be the matching plan next period
following this deviating allocation. We now show that if one follows the monotonicity rule at
period t and the same assignment rule fˆt+1, one can achieve a weakly higher surplus. In other
words, the maximum surplus at t + 1 generated under the deviation is also achievable if one
follows the monotonicity rule at period t. As a result, the maximum surplus must be weakly
higher when monotonicity property is satisfied.
Given that the matching must be across groups and with di↵erent holding, for simplicity,
we use  ⇤( i) to denote the volatility of the optimal counterparty of type- i trader under fˆt+1,
and ⇡j⇤ ⌘ ⇡Ht+1( ⇤( i)) for i = 1, 2. First, consider the case when both agents are actively
matched with a trader  ⇤( i) 6= {;}. If  i >  ⇤( i), the sum of expected payo↵ generated by
the pair{( i, A, k), (j⇤( i), 0, k0)} and the pair{( i, 0, k), (j⇤( i), A, k0)} at period t+ 1 yields:
 ˆt( i, ki)t+1A
 
⇡ˆHt+1( i, A, ki)(y +  ) + (1  ⇡ˆHt+1( i, A, ki)(y + (⇡j⇤   1) ⇤( i))
 
+ (1   ˆt( i, ki))t+1A
 
⇡ˆHt+1( i, 0, ki)(y +  ) + (1  ⇡ˆHt+1( i, 0, ki)(y + (2⇡j⇤   1) ⇤( i))
 
= t+1A
 
⇡Ht (z)(y +  i) + (1  ⇡Ht (z))(y + (2⇡j⇤   1) ⇤( i)
 
If  i <  ⇤( i), the total surplus is then
 ˆt( i, ki)t+1A
 
⇡j⇤(y +  
⇤( i)) + (1  ⇡j⇤)(y + (2⇡ˆHt+1( i, A, ki)  1) i)
 
+ (1   ˆ( i, ki))t+1A
 
⇡j⇤(y +  
⇤( i)) + (1  ⇡j⇤))(y + (2⇡ˆHt+1( i, 0, ki)  1) i)
 
= t+1A
⇥
⇡j⇤(y +  
⇤( i)) + (1  ⇡j⇤)y + (1  ⇡j⇤)(2⇡Ht (z)  1)
⇤
.
Observe that, in both cases, the resulting surplus is independent of ⇡ˆHt+1( i, a, ki) and  ˆt( i, ki),
which is a function of the allocation rule at period t. In other words, the same expected payo↵
can be achieved for any arbitrary allocation rule at period t, including the one that satisfies the
monotonicity rule.
Second, consider the case that, at period t + 1, one of agents matches with none and the
other one matches with a trader  ⇤( i). Conditional on giving  ⇤( i) exactly the same payo↵,
it is clear that the following matching plan gives a strictly higher surplus for both periods: (1)
letting  2 reach e cient allocation at period t and match with none at t+ 1 and (2) letting  1
match with  ⇤( i) and give  ⇤( i) the same payo↵. Lastly, if both agents matches with none
under fˆt+1, what matters is only the flow payo↵ of holding the asset and hence the payo↵ is
strictly higher when monotonicity holds.
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A.1.5 Proof for Proposition 4
To prove Proposition 4, we first provide the complete characterization of an decentralized equi-
librium and then prove that it satisfies all conditions and then show that it is constrained
e cient.
Characterization: In an economy with N rounds of trade,
– Matching outcomes: The dynamic equilibrium follows a recursive structure, where match-
ing at period t is characterized by a cuto↵ volatility type,  ⇤t , such that G( ⇤t ) = 12t , for
t = 1, . . . , N . And the equilibrium distribution is characterized by equations (20) and
(21).
ˆ  ⇤t 1
 ⇤t
ft(( , a, k), ( ˜,a
0, k0))d ˜ =
8><>:
1
2g( ), if t = 1,
g( )
 
⇡Lk0I{a = A}+ ⇡Hk0 I{a = 0}
 
,
if  L      ⇤t 1, t > 1,
(20)
ft(z, {;}) = g( )
 
⇡Hk I{a = A}+ ⇡Lk I{a = 0}
 
, (21)
if  ⇤t 1 <     H , t > 1.
– The probability that a trader-z has a high preference realization is given by⇡H1 (z) = ⇡
H
k
and for t   2 :
⇡Ht ( , A, k) =
(
1, if  ⇤t 1   ,
⇡Hk if     ⇤t 1.
(22)
– The contract  ⇤t (·, ·) within the pair: 1) the asset allocation is given by
↵t
 
(v, z) ,
 
v0, z0
  
=
(
A, if   >  0, v = H, or     0, v0 = L,
0, if   >  0, v = L, or     0, v0 = H, (23)
and 2) the transfer
 
(qvakt , q
vb
kt)
 
k2{R,B},v2{H,L} is given by equations (24) and (25):
qHakt = t(y +  
⇤
t ) +  q
a
k0t+1, q
La
kt = ty +  q¯t+1 +
1
2
 
⇡Lk0
⇡Hk0
ckt+1, (24)
qHbkt = ty +  q¯t+1 +
1
2
 
⇡Hk0
⇡Lk0
ckt+1, q
Lb
kt = t(y    ⇤t ) +  qbk0t+1, (25)
where qakt ⌘
P
v ⇡
v
kq
va
kt , q
b
kt ⌘
P
⇡vkq
vb
kt , ckt+1 ⌘ qbkt+1   qbk0t+1 = qakt+1   qak0t+1,q¯t ⌘PN
s=t  
s tys, and the last period transfer is given by
qHakN = N (y +  
⇤
N ), q
La
kN = q
Hb
kN = Ny, q
Lb
kN = N (y    ⇤N ). (26)
44
– The equilibrium payo↵ of traders W ⇤t (z) is given by equations (27) and (28).
W ⇤t (A, , k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
⇡Lk0
 
t
⇥
y + (2⇡Hk   1) 
⇤
A+  W ⇤t+1(A, , k)
 
+⇡Hk0
 
qaktA+  W
⇤
t+1(0, , k)
 
, 8    ⇤t
⇡Hk
 
⌃Ns=ts(y +  )A
 
+ (1  ⇡Hk )qbktA, 8 ⇤t <     ⇤t 1,
⌃Ns=ts(y +  )A, 8 ⇤t 1 <  .
(27)
W ⇤t (0, , k) =
8>>>><>>>>:
⇡Lk0
 
t
⇥
y + (2⇡Hk   1) 
⇤
A  qbk0t
+ W ⇤t+1(A, , k)
 
+ ⇡Hk0 W
⇤
t+1(0, , k), 8    ⇤t ,
⇡Hk
 
⌃Ns=ts(y +  )A  qak0tA
 
, 8 ⇤t <     ⇤t 1,
0, 8 ⇤t 1 <  .
(28)
Proof. The constructed equilibrium can be understood as follows: Each period, a trader
chooses to be a market maker (m), a customer (c), or inactive;.The payo↵ of a trader depends
on the role he choose to plays (this choice is denoted by ⇢ 2 {m, c, ;}). Since the matching must
be across groups, a trader in group k who chooses to be a customer trade with market maker in
group k0. If a trader ( , k) chooses to be a “customer”, ⇢ = c, he keeps the asset if and only if
he has a high realization. If he needs to buy, he pays the ask price, denoted by qvak0t, charged by
the market-maker with realization v in group k0. If he needs to sell, he receives the bid price,
denoted by qvbk0t, from this market maker. On the other hand, if a trader with realization v in
group k chooses to be a “market-maker” (⇢ = m), he keeps the asset for that period only if the
customers have a low realization, and he buys at the bid price qvbkt and sells at the ask price q
va
kt .
Note that we allow for the price schedule
 
(qvakt , q
vb
kt)
 
k2{R,B},v2{H,L} that is contingent on
the market maker’s own preference. In particular, we will look for the price implementation such
that the constructed matching rule also satisfies trader’s ex-post incentives. From a viewpoint of
a customer in group k, the expected bid/ask spread thus depends on the distribution of market
maker’s valuation in group k0, and is then given by qak0t ⌘
P
v ⇡
v
k0q
va
k0t, q
b
kt ⌘
P
⇡vk0q
vb
k0t.
Formally, let Wˆ vt (z, ⇢) denote the utility of a trader of type z = ( , a˜, k) with preference
realization v 2 {H,L} who chooses the role ⇢. We now prove that given the constructed price,
traders’ choice would satisfy the cuto↵ matching rule in each period characterized by equations
(20) and (21). That is, in period t, a trader with type    ⇤t chooses to be a market maker, and
a trader with type   2 [ ⇤t , ⇤t 1] chooses to be a customer; and a trader with type   2 [ ⇤t 1, H ]
(who were customers last period) stay inactive.
Since di↵erent role choice leads to di↵erent combination of the probability of owning the
asset and price, W vt (z) = max⇢˜2{m,c,;} Wˆ vt (z, ⇢˜) can be conveniently rewritten as
W vt ( , A, k) = max⇢
 vkA(⇢)
⇥
t(y + ⇠(v) )A+  W
v
t+1( , A, k)
⇤
+(1   vkA(⇢))
⇥
⌧vkA(⇢)A+  W
v
t+1( , 0, k)
⇤
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W vt ( , 0, k) = max⇢
 vk0(⇢)
⇥
t(y + ⇠(v) )A  ⌧ vk0(⇢)A+  W vt+1( , A, k)
⇤
+ (1   vk0(⇢)) W vt+1( , 0, k)
where given any v2 {H,L} and a 2 {0, A},  vka(⇢) denotes the probability of keeping the asset
after the trade in that period and ⌧vka(⇢) denotes the transfer per asset. ⇠(H) = 1 and ⇠(L) =  1.
Both of them are mapped to the role choice ⇢ and thus have the following expressions:
{ HkA(⇢), ⌧HkA(⇢)} =
8><>:
{1, 0}, if ⇢ = c,
{⇡Lk0 , qHakt }, if ⇢ = m,
{1, 0}, if ⇢ = ;,
{ LkA(⇢), ⌧LkA(⇢)} =
8><>:
{0,Pv qvbtk0}, if ⇢ = c,
{⇡Lk0 , qLatk }, if ⇢ = m,
{1, 0}, if ⇢ = ;,
{ Hk0(⇢), ⌧Hk0(⇢)} =
8><>:
{1,Pv qvatk0}, if ⇢ = c,
{⇡Lk0 , qHbtk }, if ⇢ = m,
{0, 0}, if ⇢ = ;,
{ Lk0(⇢), ⌧Lk0(⇢)} =
8><>:
{0, 0}, if ⇢ = c,
{⇡Lk0 , qLbtk }, if ⇢ = m,
{0, 0}, if ⇢ = ;.
Lemma 4 Given the transfer
 
(qvakt , q
vb
kt)
 
k2{R,B},v2{H,L} characterized by equations (24) and
(25), the following property holds for any t,
WHt ( , A, k) WHt ( , 0, k) = qak0t, WLt ( , A, k) WLt ( , 0, k) = qbk0t. (29)
Proof. The probability for a trader to hold optimally a units of asset at period t is denoted by
 v⇤kta( ) ⌘  vka (⇢⇤t ( , a, k)) , where ⇢⇤t (z) 2 argmax⇢˜2{m,c,;} Wˆ vt (z, ⇢˜).
For period N , clearly that  H⇤Na( ) is increasing in   and  
L⇤
Na( ) is decreasing in   because
continuation value is 0. Hence, given  ⇤N , there exists
 
(qvakN , q
vb
kN )
 
k2{R,B},v2{H,L} that solves
 vt ( 
⇤, a˜, k) = 0 for v 2 {H,L}, a˜ 2 {0, A}, k 2 {R,B}, where  vt (z) ⌘ Wˆ vt (z, c)  Wˆ vt (z,m).
 HN ( 
⇤, A, k) = ⇡Hk0
 
N (y +  
⇤
N )  qHakN
 
A = 0,
 LN ( 
⇤, A, k) =
"X
v0
⇡v
0
k0q
v0b
k0N   ⇡Hk0 qLakN   N⇡Lk0(y    ⇤N )
#
A = 0,
 HN ( 
⇤, 0, k) =
"
 
 X
v0
⇡v
0
k0q
v0a
k0N   ⇡Lk0qHbkN
!
+ ⇡Hk0N (y +  
⇤
N )
#
A = 0,
 LN ( 
⇤, 0, k) = ⇡Lk0
h
qLbkN   N (y    ⇤)
i
A = 0.
Setting qLakN = q
La
k0N = q
Hb
k0N = q
Hb
kN = Ny gives the expression in equation (26).
28 Given the
price, regardless of the initial position a, traders with high (low) preference and      ⇤N will own
the asset with probability one (zero). Traders with   <  ⇤N , on the other hand, always strictly
28This imposition can be derived from the restriction that an ask price be greater than or
equal to a bid price.
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better o↵ to act as a market maker, who only holds the asset with probability ⇡Lk0 . That is,
 H⇤kNA( ) =  
H⇤
kN0( ) =
(
1, if      ⇤N ,
⇡Lk0 , if   <  
⇤
N ,
 L⇤kNA( ) =  
L⇤
kN0( ) =
(
0, if      ⇤N ,
⇡Lk0 , if   <  
⇤
N .
By envelope theorem, @@ {W vN ( , A, k) W vN ( , 0, k)} = 0. Given that W vN ( , A, k) W vN ( , 0, k)
is a continuous function,
WHN ( , A, k) WHN ( , 0, k) =WHN ( ⇤N , A, k) WHN ( ⇤N , 0, k) = qak0t,
WLN ( , A, k) WLN ( , 0, k) =WLN ( ⇤N , A, k) WLN ( ⇤N , 0, k) = qbk0t.
In other words, the value of owning the asset at the beginning of each period is the same for
all traders. Intuitively, for traders with      ⇤N , he will buy the asset for sure if he has a high
realization. Hence, owning the asset at the beginning of the period saves the expected asking
price, qak0t =
P
v0 ⇡
v0
k0q
v0a
k0NA. Similarly, he will sell the asset for sure if he has a low realization.
In this case, he will receive the expected bid price qbk0t =
P
v0 ⇡
v0
k0q
v0b
k0NA. On the other hand, for
traders who act as a market maker, the gain of owning the asset only changes the expected
transfer.
We now show that equation(29) holds for any t under the constructed price {(qvakt , qvbkt)
 
8k,v.
Using mathematical induction, we assume that this property holds for t+1. Since @@ 
 
W vt+1( , A, k)
 W vt+1( , 0, k)
 
= 0, by monotone comparative statics,  H⇤ta ( ) is increasing in   and  L⇤ta ( ) is
decreasing in  . Hence, given  ⇤t , {(qvakt , qvbkt)
 
8k,v solves the following equations:
 Ht ( 
⇤
t , A, k) = A⇡
H
k0
  qHakt + t(y +  ⇤) +  qak0t+1  = 0,
 Lt ( 
⇤
t , A, k) = A
⇥
qak0t  
 
⇡Hk0 q
La
kt + t⇡
L
k0(y    ⇤)
 ⇤   (1  ⇡Hk0 )qbk0t+1A = 0,
 Ht ( 
⇤
t , 0, k) = A
h
 
⇣
qak0t   ⇡Lk0qHbkt
⌘
+ ⇡Hk0t(y +  
⇤
t )
i
+  (1  ⇡Hk0 )qak0t+1A = 0,
 Lt ( 
⇤
t , 0, k) = A⇡
L
k0
h
qLbkt   t(y    ⇤t )
i
   (1  ⇡Hk0 )qbk0t+1A = 0.
And one can check that equations (24) and (25) solve the system of equations above. As a result,
 H⇤ktA( ) =  
H⇤
kt0( ) =
(
1, if      ⇤t ,
⇡Lk0 , if   <  
⇤
t ,
 L⇤ktA( ) =  
L⇤
kt0( ) =
(
0, if      ⇤t ,
⇡Lk0 , if   <  
⇤
t .
Given that  v⇤ktA( ) =  
v⇤
kt0( ),
@
@ 
 
W vt+1( , A, k) W vt+1( , 0, k)
 
= 0, and
W vt ( , A, k) W vt ( , 0, k)
=
 
 v⇤ktA( )
⇥
t(y + ⇠(v) )A+  W
v
t+1( , A, k)
⇤
+ (1   v⇤ktA( ))
⇥
 W vt+1( , 0, k) + ⌧
v
kA(⇢
⇤)A
⇤ 
    v⇤kt0( ) ⇥t(y + ⇠(v) )A+  W vt+1( , A, k)  ⌧ vk0(⇢⇤)A⇤+ (1   v⇤kt0( )) W vt+1( , 0, k) 
= (1   v⇤ktA( ))⌧ vkA(⇢⇤)A+  v⇤kt0( )⌧ vk0(⇢⇤)A.
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We then have @{W
v
t ( ,A,k) W vt ( ,0,k)}
@  = 0 and
W vt ( , A, k) W vt ( , 0, k) =W vt ( ⇤, A, k) W vt ( ⇤, 0, k) =
(
qak0t, if v = H,
qbk0t, if v = L.
Lemma 2 is immediately implied by Lemma 4. That is, one can clearly see that  vt ( , a, k)
strictly increases with  . Furthermore, one can easily check that
 
(qvakt , q
vb
kt)
 
k2{R,B},v2{H,L}satisfy
the stated conditions in Lemma 2. This therefore guarantees that traders’ optimal choice of roles
can be characterized by the cuto↵ type  ⇤t , and such a choice only depends on volatility type  ,
but not others variables (v, at, k). Hence, given the role last period ⇢t 1, the equilibrium payo↵
of traders W ⇤t (z) in the construction is then given by
W ⇤t (z) = max
⇢˜2{m,c,;}
W¨t(z, ⇢˜|⇢t 1(z)),
where W¨t(z, ⇢˜|⇢t 1(z)) ⌘
P
v2{L,H} ⇡
v
t (z|⇢t 1)Wˆ vt (z, ⇢˜|⇢t 1) and ⇡vt (z|⇢t 1) depends on the role
a type-z trader chooses to play in period t   1.29 If a trader acts as a customer last period
(⇢t 1 = c), he has A assets or no asset if and only if he has high or low preference realization,
that is, ⇡Ht ( , A, k|c) = 1 and ⇡Ht ( , 0, k|c) = 0. One can easily see that for traders who acted
as a customer last period and  >  ⇤t 1, there is no gain by participating the market at period t
so they stay inactive afterward. On the other hand, being a market-maker faces a random asset
position next period, so the probability that a maker maker is a high type is then the ex-ante
prior:⇡vt ( , A, k|m) = ⇡vk and ⇡vt ( , 0, k|m) = ⇡vk. These give the expression of equations (27),
(28) as well as the evolution of ⇡vt (z) in equation22.
To show that, given W ⇤t (z), there is no profitable deviation by violating the matching rule,
Lemma 5 establishes the submodular property of joint payo↵ in this dynamic environment. Since
traders always trade across groups and with traders with di↵erent asset holding, we assume a
simpler notations to denote the joint payo↵, ⌦ˆt( , 0) ⌘ ⌦t(( , a, k), ( 0, a0, k0)), where a0 6= a
and k0 6= k.
Lemma 5 Let  4    3 >  2    1, for any ⇡ 2 (0, 1),
⌦ˆt( 4, 3) + ⌦ˆt( 2, 1) < ⌦ˆt( 4, 1) + ⌦ˆt( 3, 2) = ⌦ˆt( 4, 2) + ⌦ˆt( 3, 1).
Proof. Given Lemma 4, since the benefit of holding the asset is independent of  . The asset
allocation within a pair simply maximizes the flow surplus, which explains the optimal asset
allocation given by equation 23. Define WFBt ( , k) ⌘ ⇡Hk WHt ( , A, k) + (1   ⇡Hk )WLt ( , 0, k)
to be a expected payo↵ of a trader if he has reached his e cient allocation and WMt ( , k) ⌘
max⇢˜2{m,c,;} W¨t(z, ⇢˜|m) to be payo↵ of a trader who acted as market maker last period, which
29⇡vt (z|⇢t 1) is part of subjective calculation of a trader when he decides to deviate from his
equilibrium choice or not. If he follows his equilibrium choice of ⇢t 1, ⇡vt (z|⇢t 1) = ⇡vt (z).
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gives the following expression:
WMt ( , k) =
X
v
⇡vk
h
⇡Lk0Wˆ
v
t ( , A, k) + (1  ⇡Lk0)Wˆ vt ( , 0, k)
i
= WFBt ( , k)  ⇡Hk (1  ⇡Lk0)
 
WHt ( , A, k) WHt ( , 0, k)
 
 (1  ⇡Hk )⇡Lk0
 
WLt ( , 0, k) WLt ( , A, k)
 
.
Hence, the joint payo↵ function of two traders ( 0, ) and  0     yields
⌦ˆt( , 0) = A
 
⇡Hk0 (y +  
0) + (1  ⇡Hk0 ) [y + (2⇡   1) ]
 
+  {WFBt+1 ( 0, k0) +WMt+1( , k)}
= A
 
⇡Hk0 (y +  
0) + (1  ⇡Hk0 ) [y + (2⇡   1) ]
 
+  
(
WFBt+1 ( 
0, k0) +WFBt+1 ( , k)
 ⇡(1  ⇡)
X
v
[W vt ( , A, k) W vt ( , 0, k)]
)
.
Since the change in the continuation value is independent of the   and k, what matters is only
the flow surplus. Hence, as in the static model, the above Lemma holds.
Given the submodular property of ⌦ˆt( , 0), one can use the same logic in Proposition 1 to
show that there is no profitable deviation if a trader violates the matching rule. Hence, we have
shown that the above construction is indeed an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the period
t⇤( , k) that a trader-( , k) reaches his first best allocation for sure is then the period that a
trader acts as a customer. Hence, the expected output for a trader satisfies the solution of
constrained e ciency in Proposition 3. This completes the proof for the proposition.
A.1.6 Characterization of Trade Volume
Proof. The measure of group-k traders having A assets at period 1 is 12 . Among these traders,
the trade volume for market makers is ⇡Hk0A and the trade volume for customers is ⇡
L
kA. The
measure of group-k traders with no asset at period 2 is 12 . Among these traders, the trade
volume for market makers is ⇡Lk0A and the trade volume for customers is ⇡
H
k A. So the trade
volume at period 1 is A
✓
1
2
⇡H
k0+⇡
L
k
2 +
1
2
⇡L
k0+⇡
H
k
2
◆
= 12A.
The measure of group-k traders having A assets at period 2 is 12
 
1
2⇡
L
k0 +
1
2⇡
L
k0
 
= 12⇡
L
k0 .
Among these traders, the trade volume for market makers is ⇡Hk0A and the trade volume for
customers is ⇡LkA. The measure of group-k traders with no asset at period 2 is
1
2⇡
H
k0 . Among
these traders, the trade volume for market makers is ⇡Lk0A and the trade volume for customers
is ⇡Hk A. So trade volume at period t is ⇡(1  ⇡)A.
The measure of group-k traders having A assets at period 3 is 14
 
⇡Hk0⇡
L
k0 + ⇡
L
k0⇡
L
k0
 
= 14⇡
L
k0 .
Among these traders, the trade volume for market makers is ⇡Hk0A and the trade volume for
customers is ⇡LkA. The measure of group-k traders with no asset at period 2 is
1
4⇡
H
k0 . Among
these traders, the trade volume for market makers is ⇡Lk0A and the trade volume for customers
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is ⇡Hk A. So trade volume at period t is
1
2⇡(1   ⇡)A. We can continue with this logic to derive
the trade volume for any period t. This concludes the proof for Vt.
The total trade volume for trade participating in period t trade is homogeneous. Therefore,
given Vt and whether a trader of type   creates a trading link at period t, it is easy to derive
V( ).
A.1.7 Proof for Proposition 6
Proof. For the immediate creditors of the first distressed FI, conditions under which they
will default is l0   e where where l0 is the loss of immediate creditors to the first insolvent FI,
l0 = l+z e
n1b
. This implies l0   e   n1be   z. So, the distressed FI and its creditors default if and
only if l   e   max{0, n1e  z}. Therefore, the proposition holds for immediate creditors of the
first insolvent FI in the network.
Denote the loss of the (k   1)th creditor to be lk 1. Since lk = lk 1+z enk , the kth creditor
on the chain will default if lk 1   e   nke   z. This constraint is not binding if 0 > nke   z,
because if the kth creditor defaults, it must be that lk 1   e   0. Therefore, the kth creditor
and all creditors between the first FI on the chain if and only if
l0   e   max{0, n1e  z}, l1   e   max{0, n2e  z}, . . . lk 1   e   max{0, nke  z}.
From which we can derive equations (17) and (18), a condition for the initial loss l0.
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